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Deepening Japan–Australia cooperation to promote regional order
Foreword
Human societies can enjoy peaceful progress only under the 
rule of law. The same is true of international society. The rule 
of law is an essential condition if cooperation and orderly 
behaviour are to be advanced in the Asia–Pacific. We need 
norms and rules that guide—and govern—relations among 
regional states. 
The Asian strategic environment is witness to one of the 
most important power shifts in history. That shift might 
produce a more cooperative Asia or a more competitive one. 
The biggest strategic question we face is not simply whether 
the future for our region will be one of war or peace: it’s also 
about the nature of that peace. Will it be a peace governed by 
rules and norms or a peace governed by power and coercion? 
There’s increasing strategic competition in our region, 
of which assertive behaviour is but one indicator. At the 
level of grand concepts, China does not openly oppose 
the rule of law. But it often brushes off calls for rules and 
norms based upon consensus and expects conformity and 
respect because of its power and history.
If legal rules and norms are truly to be found for regional 
problems, all governments will have to conform to certain 
agreed standards and accept that it’s in their national 
interest to make international law work.
Still, we need a large dose of realism: agreements will only 
be obeyed because the outcomes are perceived as beneficial 
to the interests of the government at hand. That should 
be kept firmly in mind as Australia, Japan and our key ally, 
the United States, seek to draw China into a lasting and 
peaceful Asian order.
Earlier this year Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe gave 
the Keynote Address at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore. He spoke of the fundamental importance of the 
rules-based order and Japan’s desire to play a leading role 
in bolstering this order. (His full speech is reproduced in this 
Special Report). 
Prime Minister Abe took the opportunity to note the potential 
role that the East Asia Summit (EAS) might play in the region. 
But for its potential to be realised it’s necessary to manage 
the dynamics of ASEAN ‘centrality’—ASEAN convenes both 
the ASEAN Regional Forum and EAS. 
A key challenge for Australia and Japan will be to entice 
ASEAN down the path of thinking creatively about what 
centrality means, for ASEAN as much as the broader region. 
Much of the ‘heavy lifting’ on that front will have to be done 
through coordinated bilateral action, rather than within the 
institutions themselves.
Australia and Japan share an interest in minimising the 
role that coercion plays in the Asia–Pacific and maximising 
cooperation across the region. We’re both liberal democracies, 
with a strong bilateral security relationship, an alliance with 
the United States and a genuine commitment to the rule of law. 
ASPI has this year worked on a project to explore the 
opportunities for both Australia and Japan jointly to promote 
our shared interest in strengthening the rule of law in the 
Asia–Pacific. This report sets out the project’s key findings.
In June expert meetings were held in Canberra and Tokyo 
(the latter hosted by the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs). The Canberra Symposium included regional and 
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international experts addressing the issue of how to improve 
the rule of law across the various regional ‘commons’.
ASPI hosted two visiting scholars from Japan to work in 
Canberra with other experts. Their papers informed the 
findings of this study and are included in this Special Report.
In October ASPI hosted a roundtable in Canberra to further 
explore policy proposals where both countries might focus 
their attention and resources to strengthen the rules-based 
order in the region. 
Participants across the series recognised early on that 
several regional institutions and fora, such as ASEAN and EAS, 
deal with many of these issues. The aim wasn’t to replicate the 
policy proposals emerging from those bodies, but rather 
to suggest potential initiatives where Japan and Australia 
might successfully promote regional cooperation to deal 
with a range of economic and security problems through 
the positive effects of agreed rules and legal norms. 
The region’s security architecture should be leveraged for 
the implementation of the policy proposals set out below.
The binding rules of international law are real and relevant: 
they contribute to regularising the behaviour of governments 
and contribute to a regional and global order that is more 
predictable and manageable (see Shirley Scott’s background 
paper in this Special Report).
Rather than trying to develop grand agendas, the study 
attempted to illuminate areas where both Australia 
and Japan could improve the efficiency and efficacy of 
regional rules-based cooperation (see Shiro Armstrong’s 
background paper in this Special Report). In several cases 
a key finding was that progress required a commitment to 
capacity-building and information-sharing. 
Leadership is critical for the future of a rules-based order 
in the Asia–Pacific; both Australia and Japan share a 
responsibility in that regard. Few Asia–Pacific states, we’d 
submit, measure up as well as Australia and Japan do in 
abiding by the rule of law and both will continue as major 
contributors to the rule of international law. And to that end, 
Australia and Japan should endeavour to provide a model of 
behaviour for other governments in our region to emulate, 
small and large powers alike. 
ASPI acknowledges the generous support of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Japanese Embassy in 
Canberra for this project*.
Anthony Bergin and David Lang 
Project Directors 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
* Views and recommendations expressed in this report do not represent the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan or the 
Japanese Government.
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Policy recommendations to enhance 
Japan–Australia cooperation and 
strengthen rules-based order in the 
Asia–Pacific
Maritime Security
1. Cooperate on maritime capacity building in the 
Asia–Pacific, including training personnel, assisting 
with organisational arrangements and strengthening 
relationships and abilities between relevant 
maritime agencies.
2. Identify important maritime conventions to provide 
governments with information on their value to 
encourage ratification and implementation. This should 
include assistance to improve administration and 
enforcement arrangements with regard to maritime 
conventions, noting that ambit maritime claims don’t 
encourage confidence building.
3. Encourage regional arrangements on combatting 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, including by 
strengthening port state control measures, reciprocal 
boarding agreements and innovative development of the 
Right to Hot Pursuit. 
4. Develop initiatives to bolster regional preparedness for 
transboundary oil-spill events. 
5. Encourage member countries of the Western Pacific  
Naval Symposium to support the measures outlined in 
the WPNS publication, Code for Unalerted Encounters 
at Sea, that will reduce the risk of miscommunication 
between naval and military vessels. This could be a useful 
accompaniment to later developing a regional Naval 
Incidents at Sea Agreement. 
Rule of Law in Conflict Affected States
1. Collaborate with countries in the Asia–Pacific to develop 
and deliver UN peacekeeping training programs for 
military and police personnel and assist potential or 
emerging peacekeeping contributors to navigate UN force 
generation, training and pre-deployment processes.
2. Encourage states in the Asia–Pacific to take full 
steps towards ratification of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
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3. Build awareness of human security issues and state 
responsibilities for protection of civilians through 
information exchange and funding for training and 
scholarships geared towards strengthening state 
institutions and resilience.
4. Deepen assistance to Asia–Pacific nations in the context 
of ASEAN’s dialogue partnership framework to build 
capacity in the arenas of rule of law and good governance 
in order to serve as structural measures to better manage 
conflicts and work to prevent mass atrocities.
5. Encourage states in the Asia–Pacific to become a party 
to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty and assist these 
states to implement the treaty requirements.
Trade and Economic Cooperation
1. Engage in a consultative regional process through APEC, 
EAS, TPP, RCEP and G20 to establish an understanding 
of economic cooperation priorities, reform agendas 
and regionally beneficial norms and how they might 
be supported. 
2. Develop joint regional goals for Australia and Japanese 
economic diplomacy, particularly on what the economic 
architecture should look like and steps to achieve it. 
In particular, seek to influence the evolution of key 
regional institutions towards rules-based frameworks by:
a. leading on RCEP and promoting TPP to new members 
in order to minimise conflict between the two 
economic agreements;
b. developing closer technical links with AMRO and 
understanding of the operation of the Chang Mai 
Multilateral Initiative.
3. Keep under review the inter-governmental Memorandum 
of Understanding on the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, on condition that it meets international standards 
of governance and transparency.
4. Work with Japan in APEC and RCEP to support structural 
reforms in key economies by enhancing transparency and 
strengthening market-based institutions. 
5. Keep the G20 focused on practical measures to address 
key global economic issues, such as financial crisis 
management, and on building international relationships 
by strengthening the link between regional institutions 
and the G20.
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Cyberspace and Internet Governance
1. Encourage a transparent regional dialogue through 
the ARF on international norms for cyberspace whilst 
continuing ongoing cyber confidence-building efforts. 
2. Strengthen CERT–CERT linkages in the Asia–Pacific 
through APCERT and PacCERT to bolster technical 
capabilities in the public and private sectors.
3. Identify opportunities within development assistance 
programs for ICT infrastructure hardening and ICT 
network repair post-disaster.
4. Work with the private sector, within both state-driven and 
non-state-driven international organisations to promote 
the ideal of an open internet underwritten by ICANN-led 
multistakeholderism.
5. Utilise terminology and concepts identified in the Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare and the Convention on Cybercrime to help embed 
the use of agreed terms and definitions related to cyber 
matters to help ease confusion and build regional trust 
and confidence.
6. Through APEC’s Telecommunications and Information 
Working Group develop capacity building and share best 
practice on the integrity and security of the e-commerce 
environment.
Airspace and Outer Space
1. Lead the creation of an international code of conduct for 
outer space activities.
2. Promote a regional understanding of threats to airspace 
through an annual symposium for decision-makers from 
government, military and civil service across the region.
3. Prioritise the issue of space debris management through 
multilateral and regional forums such as the ARF Space 
Security workshop.
4. Work to develop standards relating to remotely piloted 
aircraft, including for civil use, considering privacy 
and safety issues and considering opportunities for 
how Japan and Australia might achieve appropriate 
integration of these technologies.
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5. Work with regional partners and ICAO to develop an 
agreed set of rules for establishing and enforcing Air 
Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ), including crisis 
communications mechanisms, as an important step 
in decreasing prospects for tension in the Asia–Pacific 
air domain.
East Asia Summit
1. Support the creation of a permanent EAS secretariat or 
committee to build continuity between summits and 
provide greater EAS focus on strategic, economic and 
financial issues.
2. Support the EAS to strengthen linkages with the ADMM+, 
the ARF and the extended ASEAN Maritime Forum. 
3. Constitute the EAS as the premier leaders-led forum to 
engage China as a responsible and constructive player in 
the Asia–Pacific.
4. Work to support ASEAN’s role in the EAS so that it actively 
engages with extra-ASEAN powers in a collegiate way, 
especially in reducing disagreements with China.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
1. Strengthen exchange of information between HADR 
agencies in Japan and Australia and develop joint 
training, including with relevant non-government bodies. 
2. Increase joint HADR exercises with regional partners with 
a civil–military coordination focus, and include disaster 
prevention, as well as early response.
3. Develop urban search and rescue training and mentoring 
with ASEAN counterparts, in close communication 
with the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management 
and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance Centre.
4. Increase exchanges between search and rescue agencies 
across the region, including developing exercises and 
coordination between the regional centres of the IMO 
and ICAO.
5. Establish an accreditation system for foreign medical 
teams in HADR in the Asia–Pacific. 
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Japanese Prime Minister’s Speech to 
The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 
30 May 2014
His Excellency Mr Shinzō Abe, 
Prime Minister of Japan
Prepared transcript 
Your Excellency, Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Director-General 
Dr John Chipman, ladies and gentlemen, ‘Peace and 
prosperity in Asia, for evermore’.
In order to make that a reality, what should Japan do and 
how should Japan contribute? That’s what I am standing 
here to speak about. I think all of us in the room here share a 
common mission. The mission is one of pursuing better living 
standards and economic prosperity. It’s a mission of bringing 
into full bloom the latent potential of this great growth centre 
and the people living there, stretching from Asia and the 
Pacific to the Indian Ocean. We must build and then hand 
over to the next generation a stage on which each and every 
individual can prosper still more and certainly benefit from 
the fruits of growth.
‘Asia’ is a synonym for ‘growth’ and another name for 
‘achievement’. Take TPP. The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
will surely bring an overwhelming economy of scale to the 
Asia–Pacific economies. Just as a rocket picks up even 
greater acceleration in its second and third stages, the RCEP 
and the FTAAP as it were, the momentum sparked by the TPP 
will expand our free and creative economic sphere, enabling 
us to soar even higher. Asia and the Pacific will continue to 
propel the world economy forward.
And just for Japan to seek a win-win synergy with the 
Asia–Pacific region, my economic policy is now advancing 
at full throttle. If you imagine how vast the Pacific and 
Indian oceans are, our potential is exactly like the oceans, 
i.e., limitless, isn’t it? In order to have the generations of our 
children and our children’s children share in this bounty, 
it’s absolutely imperative that we make peace and stability 
something absolutely rock solid.
To achieve this, all countries must observe international 
law. Japan will offer its utmost support for the efforts of the 
countries of ASEAN as they work to ensure the security of 
the seas and the skies, and thoroughly maintain freedom of 
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navigation and freedom of overflight. Japan intends to play 
an even greater and more proactive role than it has until 
now in making peace in Asia and the world something more 
certain. As for Japan’s new banner of ‘Proactive Contribution 
to Peace’, Japan already enjoys the explicit and enthusiastic 
support of the leaders of our allies and other friendly nations, 
including every leader of ASEAN member countries as well 
as the leaders of the United States, Australia, India, the UK, 
France and others. Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule 
of law. And the rule of law for all of us. Peace and prosperity 
in Asia, for evermore. That’s what I wish to state to you today.
May I now tell you firstly how I perceive the situation? 
This region has achieved tremendous growth in the span 
of a single generation. However, a large and relatively 
disproportionate amount of the fruits of that growth is being 
allocated to military expansion and arms trading. To me, 
this is extremely regrettable. We also find ourselves facing 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction and attempts 
to change the status quo through force or coercion. Clearly 
there exist elements that spawn instability.
And yet nowhere do we find a need to be pessimistic. That’s 
my approach. Recently, President Barack Obama of the 
United States and I mutually reaffirmed that the US–Japan 
alliance is the cornerstone for regional peace and security. 
President Obama and I also mutually confirmed that 
the United States and Japan are strengthening trilateral 
cooperation with like-minded partners to promote peace and 
economic prosperity in Asia and the Pacific and around the 
globe. When Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott visited 
Japan at the beginning of April, we reaffirmed this exact 
stance, namely that in security affairs, we will further the 
trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US, and Australia. 
We clearly articulated to people both at home and abroad 
our intention to elevate the strategic partnership between 
Japan and Australia to a new special relationship. In India, 
Mr Narendra Modi has become prime minister through 
another free and fair election. I am absolutely certain that 
when I welcome Prime Minister Modi to Tokyo, we will 
successfully confirm that the Japan–India cooperation, as 
well as trilateral cooperation including our two countries, 
will make the ‘confluence of the two seas’ that is the Pacific 
and Indian oceans, peaceful and more prosperous.
Last year, I visited all ten ASEAN member countries, and 
my determination grew with each country I visited. 
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This is because these visits taught me that we share 
common groundwork regarding our commitment to valuing 
the rule of law, and that we enjoy a consensus in our respect 
for freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight. Indeed, 
in most of the countries of the region, economic growth 
has steadily brought freedom of thought and religion and 
checks and balances to the political systems, even though 
the speed of these changes varies from country to country. 
The sheer idea of the rule of law, which is one great pillar for 
human rights, has taken deeper root. Freedom, democracy, 
and the rule of law, which undergirds these two, form the 
Asia–Pacific’s rich basso continuo that supports the melody 
played in a bright and cheery key. I find myself newly gripped 
by that sound day after day.
I have now shared with you how I perceive the circumstances 
that surround us. Now, my first central point for today is 
that we must observe international law. International law 
prescribes the order governing the seas. Its history is long 
indeed, stretching back to the days of ancient Greece, 
we are told. By Roman times, the seas were already kept 
open to all, with personal possession and partitioning of 
the sea prohibited. Ever since what is known as the Age of 
Exploration, large numbers of people have come together 
by crossing the seas, and marine-based commerce has 
connected the globe. The principle of freedom on the high 
seas came to be established, and the seas became the 
foundation for human prosperity.
As history moved on, the wisdom and practical experiences 
of a great many people involved with the sea, who were 
at times literally caught up in rough and raging waves, 
accumulated into common rules. This is what we now know 
as the international law of the seas. This law was not created 
by any particular country or countries, nor was it the product 
of some sort of group. Instead, it is the product of our own 
wisdom, cultivated over a great many years for the well-being 
and the prosperity of all humankind.
Today, the benefits for each of us lie in the seas from the 
Pacific to the Indian oceans being made thoroughly open, 
as a place of freedom and peace. All of us should find one 
common benefit in keeping our oceans and skies as global 
commons, where the rule of law is respected throughout, 
to the merit of the world and humankind.
Now, when we say ‘the rule of law at sea’ – what exactly do 
we mean in concrete terms? If we take the fundamental spirit 
that we have infused into international law over the ages and 
reformulate it into three principles, we find the rule of law at 
sea is actually a matter of common sense. The first principle 
is that states shall make their claims based on international 
law. The second is that states shall not use force or coercion 
in trying to drive their claims. The third principle is that 
states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. So to 
reiterate this, it means making claims that are faithful in light 
of international law, not resorting to force or coercion, and 
resolving all disputes through peaceful means.
So that is all about common sense, the foundation of 
human society. And yet these very natural things must be 
emphasised. I urge all of us who live in Asia and the Pacific to 
each individually uphold these three principles exhaustively.
Take a look at Indonesia and the Philippines. They have 
peacefully reached agreement of late on the delimitation of 
their overlapping EEZs. I welcome this as an excellent case 
in point that truly embodies the rule of law. My government 
strongly supports the efforts by the Philippines calling for 
a resolution to the dispute in the South China Sea that is 
truly consistent with these three principles. We likewise 
support Vietnam in its efforts to resolve issues through 
dialogue. Movement to consolidate changes to the status 
quo by aggregating one fait accompli after another can only 
be strongly condemned as something that contravenes the 
spirit of these three principles.
Would you not agree that now is the time to make a firm 
pledge to return to the spirit and the provisions of the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
that all concerned countries in the Sea agreed to, and not to 
undertake unilateral actions associated with a permanent 
physical change? The time to devote our wisdom to restoring 
peaceful seas is now.
What the world eagerly awaits is for our seas and our skies to 
be places governed by rules, laws, and established dispute-
resolution procedures. The least desirable state of affairs is 
having to fear that coercion and threats will take the place 
of rules and laws and that unexpected situations will arise at 
arbitrary times and places. I strongly hope that a truly effective 
Code of Conduct can be established in the South China Sea 
between ASEAN and China and that it can be achieved swiftly. 
Japan and China have an agreement concluded in 2007 
between then-premier Wen Jiabao and myself, when I was 
serving as prime minister. That was a commitment we made to 
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create a maritime and air communication mechanism in order 
to prevent unexpected situations between Japan and China. 
Unfortunately, this has not led to the actual operation of such 
a mechanism. We do not welcome dangerous encounters by 
fighter aircraft and vessels at sea. What we must exchange 
are words. Should we not meet at the table, first exchanging 
smiles as we sit down to have discussion? It is my firm belief 
that commencing the operation of this agreement between 
our two countries will lead to peace and stability of the region 
as a whole.
Be that as it may, in my view, the time has come to place 
emphasis on ASEAN. The ARF is a meeting held at the 
foreign-minister level, while the ADMM-Plus is a meeting at 
the defence-minister level. There is no stage that outshines 
the East Asia Summit as a venue for heads of state and 
government to come together and discuss the order that is 
desirable. Keeping military expansion in check and making 
military budgets transparent, as well as enlarging the 
number of countries that conclude the Arms Trade Treaty 
and improving mutual understanding between authorities 
in charge of national defence – there is no lack of issues 
those of us national leaders ought to take up, applying 
peer pressure on each other.
I urge the further enhancement of the East Asia Summit, 
as the premier forum taking up regional politics and security. 
Next year marks the tenth anniversary of the launch of the 
EAS. I propose that we first create a permanent committee 
comprised of permanent representatives to ASEAN from the 
member countries and then prepare a road map to bring 
renewed vitality to the Summit itself, while also making the 
Summit along with the ARF and the ADMM-Plus function 
in a multilayered fashion. The first thing we should discuss 
is the principle of disclosure. We have all heard the saying 
that ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’. From now, Asia will 
continue to play the leading role in pulling the prosperity of 
the world forward. Military expansion is inherently unworthy 
of such a place as this. The fruits of prosperity should instead 
be reinvested into even greater prosperity and improving 
people’s lives. I believe that a framework under which we 
publicly disclose our military budgets step by step, that 
enables us to cross-check each other is, a system that we 
should seek to establish as we extend the scope of the East 
Asia Summit.
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Japan will offer its utmost support for efforts by ASEAN 
member countries to ensure the security of the seas and 
skies and rigorously maintain freedom of navigation and 
overflight. Then what will Japan actually support, and 
how? That is what I will talk about next. We have decided to 
provide ten new patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard. 
We have already provided three brand new patrol vessels to 
Indonesia through grant-aid cooperation. And we are moving 
forward with the necessary survey to enable us to provide 
such vessels to Vietnam as well. And it is true that Japan 
provides practical support across the board, so when hard 
assets are sent out from Japan, experts also follow, together 
with instruction in the relevant technical skills. By doing 
so, the bonds between the people invariably become 
stronger. We also convey to the partners our sense of pride 
in committing ourselves to our duties. By cultivating a high 
degree of morale and proficiency and sharing our stringent 
training, buds of lasting friendship emerge.
Even if we look only at the three countries of the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia, the number of people easily 
surpasses 250 who have learned from Japan about how coast 
guard operations should be conducted. In 2012, when we 
invited to Japan higher-ranking officials within the agencies 
enforcing maritime law in each of the five major ASEAN 
countries, all throughout the month-long training period, 
three members of the Japan Coast Guard were assigned to 
each person receiving training, with all of them living, eating, 
and sleeping together under the same roof. I understand that 
one participant from Malaysia said, ‘In Japan, the technical 
aspects of course, but also the high level of morale of each 
individual is superb. What I wish to take back home with me 
is this spirit.’ I feel that this trainee really understood what we 
were actually trying to convey.
Here in Singapore representatives of member nations of 
ReCAAP, which was created eight years ago, are on high 
alert 24 hours a day spotting piracy. Heading the ReCAAP 
Information Centre at present is a Japanese.
Recently, Japan has formulated new principles governing 
the cases in which defence equipment can be transferred to 
other countries. We are now able to send out Japan’s superb 
defence equipment, such as for rescue, transportation, 
vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping, in cases in 
which appropriate control can be ensured, on the basis of 
a strict examination. Japan and the recipient country are 
first to forge a written agreement, and then to move the 
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whole process forward, bearing in mind that each is strictly 
examined and aptitude is checked by supervision.
Japan will combine various options within its assistance 
menu, including ODA, capacity-building by the Self-Defence 
Forces, and defence-equipment cooperation, to support 
seamlessly the capacity of ASEAN countries in safeguarding 
the seas. I have stated all that as a pledge to you.
I will now talk about my final topic for today, and that is about 
the new banner Japan has chosen to raise. We are in an era in 
which it is no longer possible for any one nation to secure its 
own peace only by itself. This is a view shared throughout the 
world. That is exactly why it is incumbent upon us in Japan to 
reconstruct the legal basis pertinent to the right of collective 
self-defence and to international cooperation, including the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations.
On my watch, discussion is under way in Japan. Japan’s 
Self Defence Forces are at this very moment working hard 
to foster peace in South Sudan, only recently independent, 
under the flag of the United Nations mission there. Units from 
such countries as Cambodia, Mongolia, Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, the Republic of Korea, and China are participating in 
this same mission. There are also a great many civilian UN 
staffers as well as members of NGOs from various countries. 
They are all partners with us in the sense that they are all 
assisting in South Sudan’s nation building. Imagine now 
that civilians or NGO workers there, powerless to defend 
themselves, came under sudden attack by armed elements. 
Under the approach that the Japanese government has taken 
to date, Japan’s Self Defence Forces are unable to go rescue 
these civilians enduring the attack. Is this an appropriate 
response into the future? My government is thinking hard 
about it, and a close consultation is under way within the 
ruling coalition parties. It is precisely because Japan is a 
country that depends a great deal on the peace and stability 
of the international community that Japan wishes to work 
even more proactively for world peace, and wishes to raise 
the banner of ‘Proactive Contributor to Peace’.
Japan has for multiple generations walked a single path, loving 
freedom and human rights, valuing law and order, abhorring 
war, and earnestly and determinedly pursuing peace, never 
wavering in the least. We will continue to walk this same path, 
unchanged, for generations upon generations to come. I would 
like all of you gathered here today to understand that point 
in a way that is absolutely clear. Over what is almost now a 
year and a half, I have worked to the very best of my ability to 
remake the Japanese economy into an economy that once 
more grows robustly, abundant with innovations. People call 
this ‘Abenomics’ and classify it as a type of economic policy. 
But for me, it is a mission that goes far beyond economic 
policy. It is nothing less than an undertaking to foster ‘new 
Japanese’ who will shoulder the responsibilities of the 
coming years.
And what are these ‘new Japanese’ about? They are Japanese 
who have lost none of the good qualities of the Japanese 
of days gone by. Japanese who loathe poverty and believe 
that universal values are found in the joy of hard work have, 
since the days when Asia was still said to be synonymous 
with being impoverished, continued to contribute untiringly 
to the construction of Asia’s economies, in the belief that 
there is no reason why other Asian countries would be unable 
to accomplish what the Japanese themselves achieved. 
The ‘new Japanese’ are not different in the least from their 
fathers and grandfathers in the sense of rejoicing at each 
and every one of these selfless and unselfish contributions. 
If anything has changed, it is that women will be both the 
target recipients of, and the people responsible for, Japan’s 
support and cooperation with increasing frequency.
Bear in mind that all three of the Japanese who helped create 
the civil code and the code of civil procedure in Cambodia 
were young female judges and public prosecutors. It was 
in August 2011 that President Benigno Aquino III of the 
Philippines and Chairman Murad Ebrahim of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front held their top-level meeting in Narita, 
Japan. It was March of this year that a comprehensive peace 
agreement was finally reached between the two sides. 
Two years from now, the Bansamoro local government will 
finally let out its first cry as a newborn. Now, to help support 
the locals, in what areas is the Japanese assistance team 
concentrating their investment? One area is having women 
gain enough ability to make a living. In Mindanao, Japan built 
a vocational training centre for women. What now echoes 
through Mindanao, where the sounds of gunshots and angry 
cries have disappeared, is the light whir of sewing machines 
women are operating.
Given the fact that at the end of the day, the growth engine 
continues to be human beings and are likely to be women 
placed in an unfair and disadvantaged position, as has 
been the case until now, the ‘new Japanese’ are people 
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who spare no effort to improve the abilities of these people. 
The ‘new Japanese’ are Japanese who are delighted at the 
prosperity of Asia and the Pacific as their own personal 
source of joy and who discover values and a reason for living 
in making Japan a place of hopes and dreams for aspiring 
young people in the region. They are Japanese that could 
go beyond their national borders and have a broad-minded 
sense of self-identity.
Dozens of high school students come each year to Japan from 
China. They spread out all over the Japanese archipelago, 
spanning the nation north to south, and share their daily lives 
and their studies with Japanese high school students for 
a full year. Without exception, these young men and women 
are moved by the friendships they have made with their 
Japanese schoolmates, and go back to their home country 
shedding tears at the affection they have received from their 
host families. They head back calling Japan their second 
home. I want the ‘new Japanese’ to place even greater 
importance on that spirit of welcoming non-Japanese with 
such deep affection.
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These ‘new Japanese’ are Japanese who are determined 
ultimately to take on the peace, order, and stability of this 
region as their own responsibility. They are people who 
possess the drive to shoulder the responsibilities of peace 
and order in the Asia–Pacific region, working together 
with our regional partners with whom we share the values 
of human rights and freedom. ‘Proactive Contribution to 
Peace’ – the new banner for such ‘new Japanese’ – is nothing 
other than an expression of Japan’s determination to spare 
no effort or trouble for the sake of the peace, security, and 
prosperity of Asia and the Pacific, at even greater levels than 
before, along with our comrades in the region and partners 
who share our motivation and values. Taking our alliance 
with the United States as the foundation and respecting our 
partnership with ASEAN, Japan will spare no effort to make 
regional stability, peace, and prosperity into something rock 
solid. In our future, the highway to peace and prosperity rolls 
out wide before us. Our responsibility to the next generation 
is to bring this region’s potential for growth into full bloom. 
Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule 
of law for all of us. Peace and prosperity in Asia, for evermore. 
Thank you for your attention. Thank you very much.
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Summary of the symposium on 
strengthening rules-based order 
in the Asia–Pacific (Canberra, 2 June 2014)
With the support of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 
hosted a symposium on Strengthening rules-based order 
in the Asia–Pacific at the Hyatt, Canberra, on 2 June 2014. 
The symposium was an invitation-only event, attracting 
senior figures from academia, government, the military 
and business. The aim was to investigate the prospects for 
strengthening order-building in a range of areas, focusing on 
rules and norms in the Asia–Pacific. Each panel comprised 
a chairperson to guide discussions and three subject matter 
experts to proffer opinions on specific aspects of policy 
issues in question.
Opening session
In his opening remarks, Peter Jennings, Executive Director of 
ASPI, said that the purpose of the symposium was to enhance 
Australian and Japanese cooperation in order to strengthen 
the rule of law in the Asia–Pacific region. Mr Jennings pointed 
to the two countries’ considerable shared economic and 
financial interests, and stressed the importance of freedom 
of navigation, not only in the physical realms of sea, land and 
air, but also in cyberspace. Through enhanced cooperation, 
it’s thought that Australia and Japan could work more 
efficiently to both prevent and moderate conflict in the Asia–
Pacific. He noted that the symposium objective was to create 
achievable and implementable policy options to improve 
strategic efficacy in and between Australia and Japan.
Ambassador Yoshitaka Akimoto, Japan’s representative 
to Australia, reiterated that the ultimate focus of the 
symposium was on strengthening rules-based order in the 
Asia–Pacific. He noted that the growing economies of China, 
India and many smaller nations in Southeast Asia would 
change the landscape of Asia–Pacific relations. Ambassador 
Akimoto spoke of the security situation in the East China 
Sea and South China Sea, and commented on the unilateral 
use of force and coercive tactics to alter the status quo. 
Shared strategic goals between Australia and Japan were 
acknowledged, as were intentions to deepen relations with 
surrounding neighbours who share common values.
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Session 1: Shipping, fisheries and the maritime 
environment
Session 1 examined the nature and types of international 
legal instruments aimed at establishing rules for managing 
the oceans and their various uses. This exploration was 
particularly relevant in the light of a lack of support for and 
implementation of shipping, fishing and marine environment 
protection regimes at the national and regional levels. 
Mr Michael Kinley, then acting Chief Executive Officer of the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, chaired this session. 
He pointed to the uniqueness of Australian–Japanese 
relations: because we’re both island nations and major 
trading partners, the partnership has a special sense of shared 
aims. He believed that the maintenance of current maritime 
conventions and the implementation of new conventions 
were the most effective way for Japan and Australia to 
ensure smooth and transparent maritime operations, both 
individually and in partnership. Drawing from the success and 
efficiency of trading operations between partners within the 
European bloc of the International Maritime Organization, 
Mr Kinley said that increased efforts in regional maritime 
cooperation in the Asia–Pacific would enhance trade and 
security across the region.
Professor Taisaku Ikeshima of the Lauterpacht Centre for 
International Law at the University of Cambridge and Waseda 
University explored the maritime legal order and how it could 
be improved. He noted that, while many domestic political, 
industrial and cultural elements differ between Japan and 
Australia, there are still many areas where interests converge 
to form a basis for leadership on issues of maritime law. 
It was suggested that Australia and Japan must identify 
approaches and tools to corral the diverse interpretations 
and applications across the region. It’s essential to focus on 
the harmonisation of maritime rules and to identify minimum 
agreed standards to hold regional actors to the scheme. 
Professor Ikeshima proposed that an implementation 
action plan be developed and that a panel of experts could 
be established to monitor the progress of the regional 
maritime order.
Ms Joanna Mossop of Victoria University of Wellington 
considered the barriers to the implementation and adoption 
of international maritime conventions to underwrite a 
rules-based order. She noted significant cooperation in 
many areas but that progress in the protection of fisheries 
and the marine environment is desirable. The patchy 
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implementation of international agreements is due to three 
factors. First, divergent priorities across the region mean that 
states must find mutual interests through continued dialogue 
on priority issues. Second, subscription to international 
maritime conventions frequently arouses sensitivities about 
sovereignty. Third, variances in administrative, financial 
or technical capacity challenge the implementation of 
international maritime obligations. Ms Mossop believed 
sovereignty and marine boundary disputes in the Asia–
Pacific to be the single biggest impediment to developing 
a rules-based order and that initiatives to build confidence, 
trust and capacity, and adequate dispute resolution 
mechanisms, will be essential.
Professor Stuart Kaye of the Australian National Centre 
for Ocean Resources and Security at the University of 
Wollongong explored the legal instruments available to 
provide order in the maritime environment, offered some 
reasons why they have such poor take-up and made 
suggestions on how to encourage their use. He examined 
a broad range of baseline environmental conventions and 
compared the international use of the instruments to that of 
10 littoral Asian states, noting a lesser take-up in the region 
and great variation along the north–south axis. Professor 
Kaye proposed that a community of maritime experts from 
across the region be assembled to work collaboratively on 
maritime challenges. He noted that ambit maritime claims 
do nothing to engender a spirit of cooperation in the region, 
and that the separation of intractable territorial claims from 
the desire to widen marine protection should be a priority to 
encourage successful cooperation.
The ensuing discussion focused on opportunities for 
international collaboration. Participants noted that room 
for dialogue and an appetite for collaboration exist at the 
working level, but that politics and sovereignty issues 
keep getting in the way. Some suggested that we build 
from a strong bilateral basis and expand cooperation from 
there to embrace more regional actors.
Session 2: Promoting rule of law in conflict-affected 
states
Session 2 examined opportunities for Japan and Australia 
to cooperate in the Asia–Pacific region in promoting 
the responsibility to protect (R2P), conflict prevention 
and peacekeeping engagement. The panel discussion 
was opened by Professor Gareth Evans of the Australian 
National University. He described the range of prevention 
activities that aimed to avert the outbreak, continuation and 
recurrence of conflict. Respect for the rule of law meant the 
non-arbitrary exercise of state power, ensuring that state 
institutions are subject to the law, and guaranteeing that the 
law is applied to all people equally. Professor Evans held that 
it’s important to get law, justice and governance issues right 
if conflict is to be prevented.
Dr Noel Morada from the Asia-Pacific Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland 
described the development of the norm of R2P. Adopted in 
2005, R2P identifies the primary responsibility of states to 
protect their populations against four mass atrocity crimes: 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. The first two pillars—which focus on prevention 
and international assistance for capacity-building, 
respectively—were much less controversial in the ASEAN 
context. In Southeast Asia, promoting R2P focuses on the 
norm as a friend of sovereignty, not an enemy, and one that 
also enhances the legitimacy of the state. This includes 
regional capacity efforts within the region—for example, 
building awareness and constituencies of local champions, 
developing national architectures to prevent mass atrocities, 
and convincing governments to conduct training and 
education for government officials. Dr Morada suggested that 
Japan and Australia could contribute in building capacity 
in the region around pillar 2, which includes developing 
action plans to develop good governance and the rule of law, 
security sector reform, and creating and enhancing national 
institutions for the protection of human rights, as well as 
focusing on human development, conflict prevention, and 
peace building in conflict areas.
Dr Toshiya Hoshino from Osaka University discussed conflict 
prevention, with a focus on conflict analysis, the role of the 
UN Security Council, human elements in international norms 
and the concept of coexistence. In any effort to prevent 
conflict, it’s important to understand the root causes of 
the conflict and the context. He suggested that, in contrast 
to the focus on human rights efforts in the 20th century, 
the 21st century is about emphasising human elements 
in international norms (such as R2P). Discussions now 
focus more directly on the security of the human being. 
Dr Hoshino suggested that the UN Security Council has an 
important role to play in creating norms and authorising 
action. He suggested that Australia and Japan could use their 
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time as non-permanent members of the Security Council 
to further develop norms and policies in support of conflict 
prevention efforts.
Ms Lisa Sharland from ASPI explained developments and 
trends in UN peacekeeping and the opportunities they 
present for Japan and Australia to cooperate in the region. 
Military personnel from both countries are already working 
alongside one another in the UN mission in South Sudan. 
Several countries in the Asia–Pacific region have recently 
signalled their intention to increase their engagement in 
UN peacekeeping, including Indonesia, China and Vietnam. 
These developments present several potential areas for 
Japan and Australia to cooperate in the region, including 
in supporting regional peacekeeping training efforts (for 
military and police), assisting countries that are starting 
to contribute, and deepening political engagement on 
peacekeeping policy through the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly.
During the discussion that followed, several participants 
noted opportunities for Australia and Japan to assist 
countries in the region (specifically, Burma, Fiji and 
Indonesia) with their peacekeeping engagement efforts.
Session 3: Sustaining rules-based order in 
international trade and economic cooperation
Session 3 explored international trade and economic 
cooperation as the basis of significant opportunities for 
continued growth across the Asia–Pacific. The session was 
chaired by Professor Peter Drysdale AM of the Crawford 
School of Public Policy at the Australian National University. 
He first noted that, while economic rules are central to 
relations between states in the Asia–Pacific, those relations 
are dominated entirely by the global rules-based order 
that governs the trade and economic system. The system 
under which international trade arrangements have been 
built has underwritten post-war growth, prosperity and 
participation in the Asia–Pacific. Professor Drysdale noted 
that the international trading system has both economic and 
political aspects. While there are concerns that the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) hasn’t moved forward on new 
issues or responded well to the emergence of new powers, 
it has provided powerful protection against both economic 
and political forces that might have encouraged deep 
protectionism through the global financial crisis. A plethora 
of bilateral trading agreements diverge from the core 
principles of the global regime in their preferentialism, but 
they have little impact on the system because they have so 
far been limited. The tasks now are to determine where the 
global trading system is headed in the light of mega-regional 
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
and to understand how the global and regional systems will 
work together.
Dr Joshua Meltzer of The Brookings Institution explored 
how regional economic and trade policies could be 
harmonised to support international economic cooperation. 
He recognised that peaceful development in the region 
will hinge on positive US–China bilateral relations and that 
the two countries’ economic relationship will contribute 
importantly to the development of regional norms. While 
this relationship is recognised as a source of stability, it’s 
also a noted point of political tension and irritation, and 
there’s a narrative in Washington that China no longer plays 
fair in the international trading system. Despite challenges, 
opportunities to develop foundational norms in the region 
remain. China’s new program of significant domestic reform 
can be used to open the way for international cooperation. 
Trade agreements are a paradigmatic example of rule of 
law at the international level, so the TPP and RCEP are 
both opportunities to get trade and investment rules 
right. Dr Meltzer noted that the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism has been a huge success with buy-in across the 
regional community.
Professor Takashi Terada of Doshisha University examined 
how the rules-based order could support free trade 
and explored opportunities for liberalising regulatory 
frameworks. He provided a strong overview of Japan’s 
historical prosecution of bilateral free trade agreements, 
of which it has concluded 12 over 15 years, demonstrating 
the agreements’ consistency with the TPP’s rule-making 
coverage. The recently concluded bilateral trading agreement 
between Japan and Australia was the most recent new tool 
for developing positive regional norms. Professor Terada 
maintained that Australia and Japan should jointly urge more 
RCEP members to join the TPP, so that the TPP can overcome 
its weakness of small economic scale.
Mr Richard Andrews of the G20 Taskforce in the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet explored the G20 as 
a contributor to rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific. 
He recognised the unique position Australia maintained 
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by hosting the G20 in November 2014 immediately after the 
APEC Summit and the East Asia Summit, where collaboration 
on economic issues was also on the agenda. He noted that, 
unlike the G8, the G20 has a large representation in the region 
and that the challenge lies in developing a regional voice 
that reflects its weight in global affairs. The contributions of 
the G20 as a global forum will be contextually related to the 
international environment in which regional cooperation 
takes place. Mr Andrews noted that the G20 is essentially 
an economic forum but that it has the potential to produce 
beneficial spillovers into other areas, such as conversations 
to support stability in the Asia–Pacific. It has sought to 
improve global economic resilience, help countries to find 
shared solutions to shared problems, build trust through 
decision-making processes and interact positively with other 
regional institutions.
Discussion of Japan’s and Australia’s promotion of norms in 
the RCEP and TPP followed. Participants pointed out that a 
number of countries in the region are attempting domestic 
reforms that will ultimately support global agreements 
on trade, and that will have to be complemented by 
international efforts.
Session 4: Cyberspace and internet governance
Session 4 explored opportunities for Japan–Australia 
cooperation in the cyber commons. The panel discussion 
was moderated by Dr Tobias Feakin, Director of the 
International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI. Dr Feakin 
recognised cybersecurity as part of the ‘core business’ in 
traditional security, in contrast to the view that it’s part of 
non-traditional security. Referring to ongoing discussions in 
the international community about how much the internet 
should be controlled by states or through multi-stakeholder 
processes, he spoke of a need to avoid the ‘Balkanisation’ 
of the internet. The Asia–Pacific is a particularly interesting 
arena for cyber competition, and one in which there’s much 
potential for Japan and Australia to cooperate to strengthen 
cyber norms and practices.
Dr Hitoshi Nasu of the College of Law at the Australian 
National University considered how the geopolitical context 
affects the development of a regional legal framework for 
cybersecurity and how cyber capabilities will challenge 
existing international law. Cyberspace is a new domain for 
militaries, and many are still reconciling the technologies 
with their traditional structures. On cyber capabilities and 
preparedness in the Asia–Pacific, Dr Nasu saw marked 
variation across the region. While states are reluctant to 
commit to rules, there’s a need to develop a capacity through 
international law so that cybersecurity problems, particularly 
those posed by non-state actors, can be managed effectively. 
He spoke of a need for militaries and states to engage in 
meaningful dialogue on cyber capabilities, particularly 
defensive capabilities, and recommended the UN Group of 
Government Experts’ decision as a guide for a priorities list.
Ms Maeve Dion of the Department of Law at Stockholm 
University considered cyber norms. What do they look 
like? How can or should states shape them? What kinds of 
regulation or intervention are needed to moderate norms 
and practices in the cyber realm? She recommended that the 
discussion on cyber issues be deepened to reflect the variety 
of meanings that different cyber actors give to similar terms 
currently in the cyber lexicon; different meanings can result 
in different thresholds for action in areas of justice, foreign 
affairs, defence, corporate cybersecurity, and so on. Ms Dion 
believed that members of the international community 
need to identify their own cyber issues of concern much 
more clearly before common interests can be identified 
and managed efficiently on a bilateral or multilateral basis. 
She proposed that appropriate models for tackling cyber 
issues can be found in existing public international law and 
cooperative international efforts in security and disaster 
response (beyond traditional defence concepts).
In the discussion that followed, participants noted that 
the cyber domain is a new area of operations for most 
governments and militaries, leading to difficulties in 
knowing where cyber matters fit in the legal perspective. 
The Asia–Pacific has some unique cyber challenges and 
conflicting views in almost every area of cybersecurity. 
On a positive note, working-level dialogues across Asia have 
mostly been kept open despite political tumult. There was 
broad consensus that cooperation could be enhanced by 
capitalising on existing national cyber strengths. Japan 
and Australia are seen to be strong supporters of the 
multi-stakeholder model of internet governance, and that 
common interest is proposed as a foundation on which to 
strengthen the rules- and norms-based cyber order.
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Session 5: Emerging challenges in airspace and 
outer space
Session 5 explored issues related to airspace and outer 
space. The session was chaired by Air Marshal John 
Harvey AM (ret’d), who began by noting how both domains 
are critically important for economic and human wellbeing, 
and that processes in these commons can be easily 
disrupted. The most significant and imminent problems 
involve tensions associated with overlapping air defence 
identification zones in the region, the build-up of space 
debris and, seemingly, a new ‘space race’ between China and 
the US. He mentioned the rise of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(‘drones’), and noted that their proliferation raises questions 
about whether current laws covering their use—at domestic 
and international levels—are adequate for the protection of 
national security.
Group Captain Dr Ian Henderson AM of the Military Law 
Centre and Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law spoke on 
the contested regional airspace commons, and offered 
suggestions for protecting the openness and stability of 
the commons and for international agreements needed to 
strengthen its governance. He argued that many issues and 
conflicts between states over airspace and outer space stem 
from the lack of universally accepted definitions of some 
aspects of those commons. In the first instance, definitions 
are needed for the limits of airspace and outer space and for 
air defence identification zones (not all states define which 
activities can occur in various classes of airspace). Much of 
the legal framework for airspace has its roots in the laws 
of the sea; however, confusion has arisen about aspects of 
contiguous and exclusive economic zones that apply to the 
sea but have very limited application to the airspace above it.
The discussion that followed explored cooperation in the 
outer space domain between Japan and Australia. Japan 
leads the Asia–Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, and 
Australia contributes significantly. Participants suggested 
that the Australia–Japan relationship could be extended 
to cooperation on satellite technology. They recognised 
unmanned aerial vehicles as one of the more pressing issues 
in the aviation space today because drones pose a challenge 
to civilian privacy as well as to military and state processes.
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Background paper
A rules-based order for the Asia–Pacific: 
identifying opportunities for Australia–Japan 
cooperation
Shirley V Scott 
Associate Professor of International Relations 
University of New South Wales
Australia and Japan have much in common. Situated on 
similar meridians of longitude, both are island nations 
that consequently share a strong interest in maritime 
affairs. The two countries are major trading partners. 
Both are responding to the changing power dynamics in the 
Asia–Pacific region, particularly the rise of China, from the 
perspective of being close allies of the US, although Japan 
is geographically much closer to China than is Australia. 
Both are democracies strongly committed to the rule of law 
domestically and to a rules-based order internationally. 
The common prioritisation of the international rule of law 
is more than an abstract ideal; it follows from a belief that 
the rule of law is an important prerequisite for sustainable 
prosperity and security.
Why are rules needed?
A rules-based international order provides a standard against 
which one’s own behaviour and that of other states can be 
measured. This creates shared expectations about how other 
states are likely to conduct their affairs. The benchmarking of 
acceptable and non-acceptable ways of conducting security, 
political and economic affairs gives states a basis on which to 
anticipate and interpret the actions of others. International 
law thus provides ‘rules of the game’ by which bilateral, 
regional and global relations can be conducted and by which 
to mitigate the effects of the differences that inevitably arise 
during the course of any relationship.
International institutions are underpinned by international 
law insofar as international organisations are established by 
treaty. Such treaties contain substantive law but also specify 
mechanisms by which to enhance their effectiveness and 
resolve disputes through peaceful means. Since the creation 
of the United Nations in 1945, the global rules-based order 
has prohibited the use of military force to pursue national 
agendas and obliges states to resolve their disputes through 
peaceful means.
It offers a catalogue of ways for doing so, from bilateral 
negotiations (the least formal) through to conciliation, 
arbitration, mediation and judicial settlement. The selection 
of a dispute resolution mechanism is an art as much as 
a science, insofar as there’s no one method that’s appropriate 
for every dispute and welcomed by every player. This helps 
explain why the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
to hear only cases to which states have consented. 
The WTO is unusual in having a compulsory system of 
dispute resolution.
A core principal of the rule of law is that all are equal before 
the law. A rules-based international order therefore tends to 
be more stable than a political order based on naked power.
Although a rules-based international order is important, it 
has some limitations. First, as in any system of law, its subject 
matter and even the content of its rules may to some extent 
reflect the norms and preferences of those most influential 
in its creation. This is significant insofar as states that didn’t 
contribute to the shaping of specific legal regimes may 
regard those regimes as less legitimate for that very reason. 
It’s difficult to achieve compliance with international law 
through military force, although military force may sometimes 
play an enforcement role. Legitimacy is therefore an intrinsic 
characteristic of a genuine rules-based international order.
Second, the issues being addressed by policymakers 
inevitably change over time, which means that the law 
must necessarily adapt, grow and expand if it’s to remain 
relevant to changing circumstances; international law can 
be regarded not only as an entity but as a process. A true 
rules-based international order must therefore contain 
an optimal balance between change and stasis: too much 
change to the rules, and the order can no longer be said to be 
based on those rules; too little change relative to the context 
in which it functions, and the order will become brittle and 
susceptible to fracture. Managing that balance requires 
careful judgement by those assuming leadership roles in 
the order.
Third, because the international political system is ‘anarchic’ 
(that is, without a supranational authority) at both the 
regional and global levels, there are systemic constraints on 
a rules-based order. Most fundamentally, it’s more difficult to 
enforce laws against the most powerful within the regional 
or global system than it is for the most powerful to enforce 
law, or to ensure that law is enforced, against others. This is 
to a certain extent inevitable, but if law becomes no more 
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than a synonym for power, the basis of the international 
order is no longer law, but power. Given the integral nature of 
international law and contemporary world politics, such an 
outcome would be likely to detract from the legitimacy not so 
much of the legal system itself, but of the regional or global 
power that refused to subject its policies and actions to the 
system of law.
Why do countries participate in a rules-based 
order?
States sign up to a rules-based order because they perceive 
it as in their interests to do so. This is most fundamentally 
a practical question: international law is integral to 
international interaction of every type, so it’s simply 
not viable for a state wishing to benefit from trade and 
transboundary exchanges to remain outside the system. 
Many transnational issues can’t be resolved unilaterally, so 
states need to coordinate their own policy preferences with 
those of others and with those over whom they exercise 
jurisdiction in order to address the issues as effectively 
as possible.
States also sign up to a rules-based order because it 
provides remedies and mechanisms through which to obtain 
remedies in the event that another state or international 
actor breaches the rules to which it has agreed. Business 
may be attracted to a country in which foreign direct 
investment is buffered from potential risks by law; in the 
same way, regional trade and investment will be more likely 
to grow in an environment in which the ‘rules of the game’ 
are established, what are perceived to be the reasonable 
rights and obligations of each party are balanced, one’s 
commercial and financial interests are protected, and the 
rules are enforceable.
States abide by rules because they perceive it as in their 
interests to do so. This may sometimes be because they 
feel an obligation to comply with the rules even though 
the outcome would otherwise not be in their immediate 
interest. Policymakers may wish to avoid sanctions for 
noncompliance, or they may have already aligned their 
practice with the law so that the question of whether or 
not to comply does not arise in practice.
However, a rules-based international order is more likely to 
last over the long term if states are complying not only out of 
a sense of obligation but because they believe that this will 
produce an outcome in line with their interests as they see 
them. In theory, this will always be the case because states 
become bound by specific rules by consent. In practice, 
the correlation might not be as direct as the theory suggests. 
For example, the rules may pre-date the sovereign existence 
of the state or may be combined as packages of norms and 
rules of which a country must accept all or none.
How can compliance with existing rules be 
strengthened?
Below the highest political questions, such as those about 
the use of force, a potentially more fruitful question to ask is 
‘Why do states sometimes fail to comply with international 
law?’ In most cases, the reason isn’t wilful disobedience but 
a lack of capability, clarity or priority.1 Rates of compliance 
may be increased by enhancing transparency in the regime 
for measuring the parties’ performance. Self-reporting is 
common in international legal regimes, although it imposes 
a burden on parties. Improved compliance with reporting 
regimes, as well as compliance with substantive provisions, 
may be achieved through clarifying and simplifying the 
requirements and through providing technical and financial 
assistance, training and institutional support to build 
capacity where needed.2
The effect of such measures is to tighten the congruence 
between legal orders at the global, regional, national and 
subnational levels. Public international law is primarily a 
state-based system of law in which national governments 
both create the law and assume responsibility for 
implementing it. However, most states adopt a ‘dualist’ 
approach to the domestic implications of international 
law, meaning that the creation of new international law 
doesn’t automatically alter the municipal, or domestic, 
legal system. There may be institutional impediments or 
delays in implementing international law commitments at 
the domestic level that might or might not stem from a lack 
of political will at the national level.
Dispute resolution can also increase compliance. One of 
the most significant developments in the international 
legal order in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was 
the growing number of international courts and tribunals. 
As a region, Asia has been known for its reticence to use 
formal dispute resolution processes; its leaders generally 
prefer to address issues through diplomacy rather than in 
the courtroom.
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However, there’s been a shift in recent years. The International 
Court of Justice has heard cases between Singapore and 
Malaysia3 and between Australia and Japan.4 Both China and 
Japan currently have judges on the bench. China has been 
active in WTO dispute settlement cases over the past decade. 
The Philippines has initiated arbitration under the auspices of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
For those states operating within a rule-of-law framework, 
initiating litigation isn’t necessarily assumed to be an 
unfriendly act. Most international litigation takes place 
among states that are working closely together for the simple 
reason that issues are more likely to arise where relationships 
are intense. Formal methods of dispute resolution, such as by 
the International Court of Justice, nevertheless tend to work 
best where all parties to the dispute are willing to submit 
their differences to the jurisdiction of the court and accept 
whatever outcome is delivered through that process.
This option might not be politically viable if the domestic 
price of a loss is too high for a government to take such a risk. 
Governments have been found to submit territorial disputes 
to judicial dispute resolution mainly when they’re willing to 
compromise but public opinion prevents them doing so and 
an external ruling provides political ‘cover’ for what would 
otherwise be a controversial settlement.5
Arbitration and conciliation are forms of third-party dispute 
resolution that are less threatening to national sovereignty 
than judicial settlement. Compulsory conciliation resulting in 
a nonbinding recommendation may suggest paths forward 
while protecting the sovereignty of the players and may be 
particularly useful where there’s ambiguity about a point 
of law.6
However, it’s worth bearing in mind that international law 
doesn’t require a state to resolve a dispute. In instances in 
which no party to a dispute could conceive of compromise 
and so no mutually acceptable resolution is possible, 
the most viable option is sometimes to find mechanisms 
by which to manage or to set aside the dispute without 
resolution in order to focus on cooperation elsewhere.
Promoting a rules-based regional order
Speaking at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe emphasised the importance of the rule of 
law and its connection to security and prosperity: ‘Peace and 
prosperity in Asia, forevermore. Japan for the rule of law. Asia 
for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us.’7
Abe’s speech made little mention of China, but his message 
was received by the Chinese Government as provocative 
and aggressive, ‘portraying China as an imaginary enemy to 
the peace of the whole region’.8 The speeches of Abe and US 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and the reaction of China 
have prompted considerable discussion.
Abe’s rule-of-law initiative can’t be dissociated from either 
the territorial disputes in the East and South China seas or 
from the US–Japan strategic alliance. Contributing to the 
maintenance of a rules-based order aligns the initiative 
with the US’s determination to ensure ‘that the Asia–Pacific 
remains an open, inclusive, and prosperous region guided 
by widely accepted rules and standards and a respect for 
international law.’9 In the words of Steve Chabot, chairman of 
the US Committee on Foreign Affairs’ subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific:
The United States presence in the Asia–Pacific is built 
on promoting regional stability, fostering respect for 
international law, advancing respect for human rights, 
and maintaining freedom of navigation and unhindered 
lawful commerce in the maritime regions. These 
objectives are fundamentally hinged on the United States’ 
alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand 
and the Philippines; our resilient relationships with 
Taiwan and Singapore; and our evolving relationships 
with Vietnam and Indonesia.10
Whereas the US used to take no position on any of the 
sovereignty claims or territorial disputes in Asia, the Obama 
administration has moved to more directly challenge the 
basis of China’s claim to nearly the entire South China Sea 
via its ‘Nine-Dash Line’. US Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Danny Russel, noted in 
congressional testimony earlier this year that any Chinese 
claim not based on claimed land features ‘would be 
inconsistent with international law’.11
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated in June 2014 
that Australia ‘will persist with calls for tensions [in the 
South and East China seas] to be resolved in accordance with 
international law and without the use of coercion or force to 
alter the status quo’, but that Australia ‘isn’t taking a view on 
the disputes themselves’.12
Maritime disputes in the region have a long reach, affecting 
regional issues that aren’t immediately related to the disputes 
(consider search and rescue, for example). In selecting specific 
issues on which Australia and Japan could cooperate in 
Embargoed until 11.59PM AEDT 18 December. Media may report 19 December 2014.
Strengthening rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific 19
promoting a regional rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific, it 
would be well to bear in mind that the closer the specific issue 
comes to having direct implications for the territorial disputes, 
the more complex and delicate it will be to pursue, the more 
it’s likely to prompt a reaction from China, and the more the US 
and Australia can be expected to tread with extreme caution.
On the US policy approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis from 
September 2012 to April 2013:
US policy-makers were aware that they faced a delicate 
balancing act: they would have to communicate sufficient 
resolve so as to discourage Chinese aggression against 
Japan, but also had to avoid signaling unconditional 
support to Tokyo, lest that be interpreted by Japan as 
a green light to take potentially provocative or reckless 
actions that would increase tensions and possibly pull 
the United States into a conflict.13
Australia, like the US, has an important relationship with 
China, and Australian officials will be likely to be aware 
of the potential to be manoeuvred to the advantage of 
another player or for Australia to be subject to attempts 
at wedge politics.14
Abe’s agenda for promoting a rules-based regional order 
was far broader than the rule of law at sea. However, it’s 
certain that any cooperation between Japan and Australia 
to promote that order will be viewed by the Chinese 
Government and by observers of the region in a geopolitical 
context, of which the recent elevation of Australia–Japan 
security cooperation is one component. It’s certainly the 
case that any possible implications of those initiatives for 
territorial disputes or for major issues in US–China relations 
(such as cybersecurity) won’t go unnoticed.
How should Japan and Australia select areas 
for cooperating to promote a rules-based 
regional order?
Identifying and seizing potential opportunities for Australia–
Japan bilateral cooperation to promote the rule of law in the 
region aligns with the recognised strengths of middle-power 
diplomacy. A valuable diplomatic contribution of middle 
powers is often that of offering intellectual and political energy. 
This can take the form of planning, convening and hosting 
meetings, setting agendas and priorities, finding practical 
solutions to specific problems in existing regimes or those 
under negotiation, or any combination of those activities.15 
The essence of middle-power diplomacy is thus often the 
exchange and nurturing of ideas and their gradual refinement 
through studies and multi-track diplomacy.
Middle-power leadership is often most effective when it 
takes the form of ‘niche diplomacy’. That is, the middle 
power doesn’t try to emulate the breadth of focus of a 
great power but concentrates its energies where those 
efforts can be expected to yield the most valuable return. 
This raises a question about the basis on which to make the 
necessary selection of issue areas. Here are some suggested, 
overlapping, areas:
• Those that will advance broad objectives, interests, 
values and norms common to both Japan and 
Australia. Prime Minister Abe set out a list of issues in his 
Shangri-La speech (see Appendix A on page 20), but that 
list is presumably not exclusive and not all the ideas on it 
would necessarily be deemed appropriate by Australia. 
What lies at the intersection of our respective priorities?
• Those that are compatible with, or more proactively 
contribute to achieving, the objectives of the US, as a 
senior ally of both Japan and Australia, in the region.
• Those of direct relevance to the region, other than 
large geopolitical questions. What are key needs of 
the region as a whole, as well as of specific countries in 
the region?
• Those that are forward-looking, whether in relation 
to the human or the natural world. What’s our region 
going to look like 5, 10, 20 or 50 years from now? What 
will best place the people of the region to prosper in 
that world?
• Those for which both countries have the necessary and 
complementary expertise. Are we the best positioned 
and equipped to be taking this issue forward?
• Those for which the outcomes of cooperation are 
likely to be greater than the sum of the individual 
contributions. Could the initiative be achieved 
readily without bilateral cooperation or pursued more 
effectively by either state taking the matter forward 
with a different partner?
• Those that have reasonable prospects of success. 
There may be many initiatives whose successful 
achievement both sides would welcome. Incremental, 
realistic steps are those most likely to yield a 
positive outcome.
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• Those likely to yield a public diplomacy dividend for 
Japan and Australia. Public diplomacy is diplomacy by 
a government directed at the public of another country. 
It’s a concept closely related to that of ‘soft power’, 
insofar as it captures the extent to which the public holds 
favourable views of another country. Japan might not 
always have reaped the degree of soft-power benefit 
warranted by its regional aid efforts, which have been 
considerable and have benefited recipients.16
This suggests that Japan may do well to use not only the 
ideological ideal of the rule of law but specific rule-of-law 
initiatives to counter Chinese rhetoric emphasising Japan’s 
militaristic past. China appears to have enhanced the public 
diplomacy effect of its aid efforts by giving other regional 
recipients what they perceived they needed.17 This suggests 
the value of engaging other regional players in the early 
stages of any bilateral rule-of-law initiative and of listening 
closely to their priorities, rather than determining the needs 
of others in the region in a paternalistic manner.
Conclusion
Australia and Japan are well placed to cooperate in 
promoting a rules-based order in the region at a time 
of renewal in the bilateral relationship. Both are fully 
committed to the rule of law at both the domestic and 
international levels and both have deep reservoirs of legal 
and other relevant expertise. Japan’s considerable history 
of engagement with international law is worth a special 
mention: the Japanese Society of International Law was 
established in 1897, nine years ahead of the American 
Society of International Law.
Prime Minister Abe’s rule-of-law initiative aligns closely 
with US and Australian priorities in the region. The rule of 
law can be used to reconcile or contain points of difference 
between players. To be effective in enhancing prospects for 
peace and prosperity, it is vital that specific initiatives chosen 
for bilateral cooperation be conceived of, and executed, 
in such a way that the two countries are able to use their 
considerable diplomatic and legal capacity to work alongside 
other actors in the region, as appropriate, for the benefit of 
the region as a whole.
Appendix A: Priorities identified by Prime 
Minister Abe in his Shangri-La speech
• Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
• Oceans and skies as global commons
• Freedom of navigation
• Freedom of overflight
• Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between ASEAN 
and China
• A maritime and air communication mechanism between 
Japan and China to prevent unexpected situations (there 
was agreement in 2007 to create one18 but this hasn’t led 
to the operation of such a mechanism)
• Human rights—freedom of thought and religion and 
checks and balances to political systems
• Increasing the number of parties to the Arms Trade Treaty
• Reconstructing the legal basis pertinent to the right of 
collective self-defence and to international cooperation, 
including UN peacekeeping operations. If civilians or NGO 
workers come under sudden attack by armed elements, 
should Japan’s Self-Defence Forces be able to go to 
rescue them?
• Women will be the target recipients of, and the people 
responsible for, Japan’s support and cooperation
Forums and mechanisms
East Asia Summit
Prime Minister Abe urged the further enhancement of the EAS 
as the premier forum taking up regional political and security 
issues. Specific actions by which to extend the scope of the 
EAS might include:
• Developing a framework within which to make military 
budgets transparent and keeping military expansion 
in check
• Creating a permanent committee of permanent 
representatives to ASEAN and preparing a roadmap 
to bring renewed vitality to the EAS
• Making the EAS, the ARF (meeting at foreign minister 
level) and the ADMM+ (defence minister level) function 
in a multilayered fashion.
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ASEAN
Japan will support ASEAN members to ensure the security 
of the seas and skies, freedom of navigation and overflight. 
Specifically Japan will:
• Build on existing initiatives, including Japanese support 
and training for those enforcing maritime law through 
coastguard operations and the ReCAAP information 
centre, and from now on, where appropriate controls can 
be ensured, to export Japanese defence equipment for 
such purposes as rescue and minesweeping.
• Support official development assistance, capacity 
building by the Self-Defense Forces, and technology 
cooperation.
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Economic cooperation in the Asia–Pacific 





The rules-based global trading system has underpinned 
huge growth in trade and the integration of economies 
that have signed on to it, whether they are political allies 
or not—and nowhere more than in the Asia–Pacific region. 
The postwar economic architecture has produced much 
closer interactions across borders and, arguably, a period 
of relative peace and prosperity the like of which hasn’t 
been seen before. Yet the global trading system faces 
challenges that not only have the potential to undermine 
economic cooperation between countries, but may also 
have implications for geopolitical relations.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
later became the WTO, is the most important element of 
the global rules-based order governing economic exchange. 
It was created in the aftermath of World War II along with the 
other Bretton Woods institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The GATT and WTO made possible the rapid development 
of many countries, which were able to transform their 
economies through trade growth. Global trade has grown at 
twice the rate of output since the 1950s. Faster trade growth 
was especially the case in East Asia, where a commitment 
to open policies and integration into the global market was 
critical in lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and 
making East Asia the world’s most dynamic economic region. 
From 1980 to 2012, the economy of East Asia grew at an 
average rate of 7.2% a year.1
The multilateral trading system operates under a set of rules 
and principles that are respected by those that are signed up 
to the system. The rules provide confidence that countries will 
not pursue short-term self-interest at the expense of others. 
Without those rules, which underpin and enforce cooperative 
behaviour, countries choose policies that are suboptimal 
for them and their trading partners. International trade is 
characterised by the prisoner’s dilemma, which delivers 
lower payoffs for each country in the absence of cooperation. 
An extreme example is the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 
which raised US tariffs in response to the Great Depression 
and halved US trade, further prolonging and deepening the 
depression.2 The collapse of the League of Nations coincided 
with retaliation against US protectionism, and there were 
significant geopolitical consequences. The collapse of 
global trade meant that imperial conquest rather than trade 
was seen as the preferred method to secure access to raw 
materials by Japan and the other ‘dissatisfied powers’.3
The experience of the interwar period, including the collapse 
of global trade, led to the establishment of one of the most 
successful and important international institutions, which 
has underpinned the liberal international order with rules 
and principles, and the multilateral trading system. Regional 
and international trade could not and did not develop and 
flourish without that robust framework of commitments to 
cooperative policy behaviour.4
It’s that system that has allowed economic interdependence 
to grow between countries committed to it, and economic 
interdependence has helped constrain conflictual political 
relations. Further rule- and order-building beyond trade—in 
investment and non-economic arenas—would be less likely 
to succeed without the underpinning of a robust and liberal 
international trading system.
This paper outlines the importance of a rules-based global 
trading and economic system for global economic prosperity 
and political stability. It examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system, as well as the major risks it faces 
today, and how the system affects geopolitical interactions.5
The primacy of economics in East Asia
The creation of the rules-based trading order allowed 
disputes and disagreements among trading partners to be 
resolved within the agreed rules and system without spilling 
over into foreign or security policy.6
The system meant that countries could open up their 
economies with confidence that they would be far less open to 
economic damage by protectionism or discriminatory exclusion 
from access to international markets. It has also meant that 
developing countries have an avenue for development based 
on trade and some ability to shape the rules and outcomes in 
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the global system. In committing to the rules and principles of 
the global trading system, governments accepted significant 
constraints on using trade policies for strategic economic or 
non-economic gain, thus creating a vastly more positive nexus 
between trade and economic policies and political security 
policies than there was before World War II.
Peace and stability are not automatically secured by increased 
interdependence, but deep commercial ties between countries 
give many (not least those with direct commercial interests 
at stake) a great stake in peace and stability.7 Those countries 
that have signed up and committed to the liberal international 
order have managed to have economic forces largely 
determine the scale and structure of trade and, to an extent, 
bypass issues of geopolitics.
Diversity in the Asia–Pacific region (which includes 
economies at different stages of development, with different 
economic and political systems, and varying degrees of 
political amity and enmity between them) has led to a 
particular character of regional economic cooperation 
and integration.8 Within the Asia–Pacific, East Asian 
economic integration is on par with that of Europe, where 
economic integration has been institution-led.9 East Asian 
economic integration has been market-led, and the major 
liberalisation efforts in the region have been unilateral and 
non-discriminatory, not preferential and discriminatory.
The proliferation of preferential free trade agreements (FTAs) 
that started a decade ago in East Asia hasn’t significantly 
diverted trade or investment away from non-members, 
mostly because trade barriers are already low except in a few 
sensitive sectors (mostly agricultural) that FTAs have failed 
to liberalise to any significant degree. Non-discriminatory 
trade policies (as well as preferential trade, which hasn’t 
delivered significant discriminatory outcomes thus far) 
are the reason why economic relationships have developed 
despite political differences. What underpinned the unilateral 
and non-discriminatory opening up of markets in East Asia 
was confidence in the global trading system and the need 
for development.
Hot economics, cold politics
Two of the largest three global trading relationships are 
those between China and the US and between Japan and 
China. The third, the US–Canada relationship, is nested 
in a strong regional agreement, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.
China’s deep economic interdependence with Japan and 
the US isn’t the result of bilateral or regional agreements 
but of the unilateral opening of the Chinese economy to the 
global economy under the multilateral system.10 The result 
is bilateral relationships that have been economically 
led instead of led by bilateral economic institutional or 
political arrangements.
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, and its 15-year 
unilateral liberalisation in the lead-up to that, had a 
profound effect on global trade, China’s economic and 
political interaction with other countries and the shape 
of the global economy.11 Prices in China and the rest of the 
world had already converged (a key measure of integration 
into the world economy) by the eve of China’s WTO 
accession thanks to its earlier tariff and other liberalisations, 
but the ‘confidence’ effect of joining the WTO saw its 
trade and investment shares increase rapidly after its 
accession (Figure 1).
The confidence effect and China’s commitment to the 
same global rules and principles that bound other 
countries were the reasons why trade between Japan and 
China, as well as Japanese investment into China, grew at 
a record pace throughout the 2000s, even while political 
relations waxed and waned over that period, sometimes 
deteriorating seriously.12
For example, from 2001 to 2006, political relations 
deteriorated and bilateral state visits between Japan and 
China were suspended. There were large-scale protests 
in China against Japan in 2005, including an attempted 
public boycott of Japanese goods. Yet trade between the 
two countries and investment from Japan into China grew 
at record pace. The growth in interdependence, and the 
constraints it put on politics, were never more evident 
than in 2006 when Prime Minister Abe—long known as 
hawkish towards China—made China his first state visit to 
‘break the ice’ in bilateral relations. It also resulted in the 
six subsequent Japanese prime ministers avoiding visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, the main factor in the poor relations 
during the prime ministership of Koizumi from 2001 to 
2006. The visit by Abe to Yasukuni in 2013 in his second 
time as prime minister, and when he appeared to have 
much more political capital, has reversed that course 
politically, but the China–Japan economic relationship 
hasn’t been derailed.
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Figure 1: Chinese average tariff rate and trade to GDP ratio, selected years
Simple average tariffs (%) Trade/GDP
Sources: Author’s calculations based on WTO statistics database (http://stat.wto.org/); UNCTADSTAT database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/); World 
Bank, China engaged: integration with the global economy, Washington DC, 1997, NR Lardy, Integrating China into the global economy, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC, 2002; T Rumbaugh, N Blancher, China: international trade and WTO accession, IMF working paper WP/04/36, International 
Monetary Fund, 2004.
The China–Japan relationship is the most striking example 
of economics dominating politics because of the scale 
and depth of economic relations and the unresolved 
history and political mistrust between the two countries. 
And, importantly, it explains why the territorial dispute over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has so far not seriously damaged 
the economic relationship.
History is littered with examples of how bad politics can 
dominate economic relations. A contemporary example is the 
India–Pakistan relationship. Despite the two countries having 
had a single market (with the free flow of goods, capital 
and people) and many similar institutions before partition, 
the political divide between the two since has meant that 
Pakistan accounts for less than 1% of India’s trade and India 
accounts for less than 5% of Pakistan’s. Without the politics, 
estimates suggest that India–Pakistan trade could be as 
much as 10 times greater.13
Unlike Japan and China, India and Pakistan do not have 
normalised economic relations. Pakistan hasn’t granted India 
most favoured nation status, despite both being members 
of the WTO. The primacy of politics between two of South 
Asia’s largest economies has prevented Pakistan recognising 
India as equal to other trading partners. And neither India nor 
Pakistan has committed to openness to the global economy 
to the extent that their East Asian neighbours have.
Strengths of the global trading system
Many countries, such as Russia recently, remain keen to join 
the WTO. This is despite some literature that suggests that 
WTO membership is largely insignificant because members 
don’t trade more or have more liberal trade policies than 
non-members.14 That literature misses the fact that there’s 
a difference between old members, especially the original 
signatories of the GATT, and members that joined the GATT 
after the conclusion of the Uruguay round. The gains from 
joining the GATT/WTO largely depend on what liberalisation 
a country agrees to undertake during the process of its 
accession to the organisation.15
The strict accession requirements that the US and the EU 
imposed on China in the bilateral negotiations leading up 
to entry in 2001 were unprecedented. They were imposed 
largely because of the impact that China was already having, 
and was predicted to have, on the international trading 
system. China’s rapid rise and the adjustments that had to 
be made were causing friction and stresses for China, its 
trading partners and the international economic community. 
More stringent rules had to be put in place for other WTO 
members to be confident that China’s accession wouldn’t 
adversely disturb the system.16 It’s precisely because of 
such unprecedented concessions that the signalling effect of 
membership to investors and trading partners was so strong. 
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The accession commitments were a blueprint for China’s 
institutional change and reforms for at least a decade from 
2001.17 Japanese investors and traders, for example, could be 
confident that China would be constrained from retreating 
from the global market.
Dispute settlement
A major role of the GATT/WTO is in dispute resolution and in 
giving members, including developing countries, confidence 
that they’ll receive fair and equal treatment. That trade 
disputes can be settled in a legal setting accepted by all 
members means that retaliation and escalation do not 
occur outside of the WTO rules. Nor do trade disputes spill 
over into sensitive political problems.
The WTO’s dispute settlement function is active and 
robust. While the number of WTO panels established to 
resolve disputes seems to have decreased in the wake of 
the global financial crisis, it has rebounded strongly since 
2010 (Figure 2). The number of disputes brought against 
trading partners by developing countries has grown 
(Figure 3), and the number of disputes that have been 
resolved or upheld demonstrates the system’s relevance 
and importance. The establishment of the Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law in 2001 demonstrates the ability of the WTO to 
adapt in order to remain relevant to developing countries.
The WTO’s legitimacy depends on its relevance to developing 
as well as developed country members. 
The recent ruling against China on its restrictions on rare 
earth metals exports18, and China’s acceptance of that 
ruling19, provide considerable confidence in the disputes 
settlement process under the WTO. Whether China’s purpose 
in restraining exports was to consolidate its domestic 
industry or for environmental reasons, the way the policy 
was executed and the anxiety it caused the international 
community (especially in Japan, which relied heavily on 
Chinese rare earth supplies) meant that the way the ruling 
was handled is an important sign of faith in the WTO. The US, 
Japan, the EU and China resolved the dispute peacefully in 
the appropriate forum without resorting to embargoes, a 
trade war or any form of conflict. This was just one example 
in which, without confidence in the WTO and its dispute 
settlement mechanism, the outcome from a trade dispute 
could have escalated into more serious conflict.
Backstopping protectionism
The WTO and the global trading system faced a major test 
during the global financial crisis. Although the advanced 
economies went into recession on a scale that matched 
the Great Depression in output and financial losses, and 
global trade flows collapsed (by 12% in 2009), there was 
no significant rise in tariffs and other trade barriers.20
Figure 2: WTO panels established, 2004 to 2013
Source: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/jfried_13_e.htm.
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Figure 3: Disputes brought forward by developed and developing countries, 1995 to 2013
Source: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/jfried_13_e.htm.
In the wake of the crisis, ‘murky’, non-tariff-based 
protectionist measures were introduced by some 
governments; some estimates suggest that they accounted 
for more than half of all protectionist measures in the 
post-crisis period.21 Policies such as local content provisions 
and industrial policies that restricted global trade were 
introduced. However, after the crisis most countries 
continued to liberalise tariffs, and changes in trade policy 
(through raising tariffs or taking anti-dumping action) 
contributed only about 2% of the observed drop in world 
trade in 2008–09.22 That was in clear contrast to the effects of 
the Smoot–Hawley tariff wars during the Great Depression.
Of the 4,144 trade measures recorded by Global Trade Alert 
from the start of the crisis to early 2014, 22.2% have been 
coded ‘green’ (that is, they represent, in the opinion of GTA, 
liberalising policy), while 57.4% have been coded ‘red’ (policy 
considered protectionist).23 One reason some developing 
countries dropped tariffs and other trade barriers in the 
aftermath of the crisis may be the rise in global supply chain 
trade: when it’s necessary to import in order to export, 
the risks of retaliation are larger and there are domestic 
producers that demand low import barriers.24 But the role of 
the WTO shouldn’t be understated. Indeed, the rise of global 
supply chains is a consequence of the rules-based trading 
system that the GATT/WTO system underwrites.
This was a significant achievement, given the acute 
protectionist pressures at the time. Leadership at the 
G20 had much to do with the ‘standstill’ on protection, 
but the shock of the global financial crisis didn’t weaken the 
WTO or undermine the confidence that countries had in it. 
The slow recovery of the advanced economies meant that 
protectionist forces put significant pressure on governments 
to close markets, but the global trading system proved robust 
to those pressures.
The robustness of the global trading system throughout 
the crisis and its aftermath has meant that recession and 
collapsed trade in some countries hasn’t generated conflict 
between nations.
Risks to the global rules-based trading system
The WTO is nonetheless confronted by a number of risks and, 
despite its dispute resolution function, its appeal to new 
members and its role as a backstop against protectionism, 
its future is often viewed as uncertain. The system has always 
faced risks and challenges to some degree and has evolved 
to stay relevant and maintain legitimacy since its creation, 
including through its transformation from the GATT to the 
WTO. But the challenges it faces now are significant, and 
multilateral trade governance appears to be drifting.
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Outdated rules, agenda and mode
The WTO has been weakened by its inability to complete 
the Doha round of negotiations that began in 2001. 
The rules it enforces and the principles it underpins don’t 
comprehend aspects of the huge growth of trade in parts 
and components and cross-border specialisation in 
tasks. The WTO has made little progress on services trade 
liberalisation (despite a promising plurilateral agreement 
currently under negotiation) and is absent in liberalising or 
governing investment in any way—two important dimensions 
of economic exchange in the 21st century.
The proliferation of supply chains has meant that investment, 
trade in goods and trade in services are all more closely 
linked than in the past, even at the launch of the Doha 
round in 2001. And the Doha round remains a work in 
progress, stuck on traditional market access issues and 
therefore unable to reinvent its own agenda. The large WTO 
membership of 159 is a strength, but the ‘single-undertaking’ 
nature of negotiations means that ‘virtually every item of the 
negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and 
cannot be agreed separately’25 and that all members have 
to agree, making consensus very difficult and a weakness of 
the WTO.
Inability to prosecute liberalisation multilaterally and the 
difficulty of dealing with ‘new’ issues in that frame has led 
to the proliferation of, or at the least provided an excuse 
for pursuing, preferential trade agreements, or free trade 
agreements (FTAs), which undermine the core most-favoured 
nation principle of non-discrimination in the WTO multilateral 
trade system. FTAs multiplied from the early 2000s but 
have run up against the same issues of sensitive sectors 
(for example, agriculture) that have stalled multilateral 
negotiations. FTAs have neither been comprehensive enough 
to affect trade or investment outcomes significantly nor gone 
much beyond WTO rules.26
Preferentialism and rule-setting among the few
The Asia–Pacific has contributed to strengthening the 
global trading system by pursuing economic integration 
regionally in a way that’s consistent with furthering global 
trade. Other regions, most notably North America and 
Europe, pursued regionalism in a more inward-looking way 
that reduced trade barriers to members at the expense of 
non-members. In the Asia–Pacific, and particularly in East 
Asia, opening up economies was done unilaterally, which 
meant opening up regionally and globally, consistent with 
the principle of open regionalism.27
Yet the new mega-regional economic agreements are 
attempting to make significant changes to domestic settings, 
beyond the goods trade. Given their design, this could 
significantly affect economic exchanges between members 
at the expense of non-members. That would be a departure 
from open regionalism and introduce preferentialism and 
discrimination that actually bites into economic relationships 
in East Asia, with potentially significant political implications.
The new mega-regional agreements of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) in the Asia–Pacific and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and 
Europe could significantly affect trade and investment in 
a way that would be quite unlike the effects of bilateral 
FTAs. The trade, investment and other rules governing 
international commerce could be written by a smaller 
club of powerful countries and become fragmented. 
The risk is that those rules will be written in favour of 
advanced economies at the expense of the world at 
large, particularly developing and emerging economies. 
There’s also a question about how these deals might 
undermine the WTO itself.
The new rules under these agreements, which discriminate 
significantly against those outside them, and the size of 
their memberships pose a threat to trade and investment 
flows globally and could undermine the most-favoured 
nation principle. And the potential fragmentation in 
the rules, in areas like dispute settlement, could also 
undermine confidence in the global system.
The ‘WTO-plus’ aspects of FTAs and mega-regionals 
damage the idea of the WTO rule of law by prescribing 
country-specific rules. If rules are negotiated in this 
manner, the large established powers will end up setting 
them, reducing the confidence and stake that developing 
countries have in the multilateral trading system. It also 
poses challenges for the dispute settlement mechanisms in 
the WTO, as the WTO-plus provisions reach into areas not 
covered in WTO agreements and the dispute settlement 
procedure will have to ‘fill in the gaps’ to determine how 
those provisions fit in with existing WTO rules. This will end 
up creating new trade laws—which the dispute settlement 
procedure is explicitly designed not to do.28
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Asymmetry in rules
Another major risk to the global trading system is the 
asymmetry in rules: newer members are typically required 
to commit much more than founding members of the GATT.29 
The different accession protocols based on the date of joining 
the GATT or WTO mean that China is subject to much more 
discipline than India, for example, and the US isn’t bound by 
symmetry in its export and import rules in the same way.
An acute example of this can be seen in the recent WTO ruling 
against China on the imposition of export controls on rare 
earth metals30 while the US isn’t prohibited from ‘utilising 
a similarly onerous licensing structure that, in practice, 
restricts US energy exports’ of liquefied natural gas and 
crude oil.31 The US is under no obligation regarding export 
duties, taxes or other restrictions consistent with GATT 
Article XI and prohibits almost all exports of crude oil.32
While the WTO has largely expunged the negative interaction 
of geopolitical security issues with trade, the intersection 
with international investment still poses a risk. Without 
a global rules-based system for investment, there’s spillover 
from the geostrategic or geopolitical to the economic issues. 
The refusal of American and Australian law makers to allow 
Huawei to invest in the National Broadband Network in 
Australia and expand operations in the US because of 
cybersecurity concerns, and Chinese regulators’ imposition 
of strict conditions on US multinationals operating in China, 
show that the line between protectionism and security issues 
is blurred.33 There’s as yet no global framework that provides 
confidence to investment host and source countries in the 
way that the WTO provides confidence in matters of trade.
Australia–Japan cooperation
Australia and Japan have played an important role in the 
stability and development of the Asia–Pacific region.34
In the postwar period, Japan has been active in creating and 
providing regional public goods, providing development 
assistance, and keeping markets open and robust. Japan 
effectively led the establishment of the Asian Development 
Bank in 1966. It was also instrumental, alongside Australia, 
in the creation of APEC in 1989. On the political–security 
front, Australia and Japan have contributed to the peace and 
stability of the region through the US alliance framework, 
and in Japan’s case its exclusively defence-oriented security 
policy underpinned by the Article 9 peace clause of the 
Japanese Constitution.
Both Australia and Japan now find themselves in a region 
with vastly different circumstances and are grappling 
for a broader framework within which to manage their 
relationships in Asia. This is especially so for how they relate 
to China, which is the most important economic partner for 
both of them. Some see a thickening of security ties across 
the US–Japan and US–Australia relationships as naturally 
extending into a formal trilateral alliance. But that has 
considerable risks, and the region needs a broader 
framework in which to engage China and other players. 
China’s the largest economic partner for almost every 
country in the region.
China is embedded in the global trading system and has 
shown that it’s keen to play a positive role in broader regional 
economic cooperation. There’s also growing concern within 
China about its tensions with neighbours. It seems that order 
building that includes China and its growing economic and 
political interests is preferred to a hedging strategy that 
isolates it politically or economically.
Australia and Japan are key players in shaping a new 
Asia–Pacific. Both are now part of the TPP and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the two 
mega-regional economic agreements under negotiation in 
Asia and the Asia–Pacific. The TPP doesn’t include China and 
the RCEP doesn’t include the US, so Australia and Japan have 
a critical role to play in ensuring that the two agreements 
don’t divide the region but are instead complementary 
and bring China and the US into a closer and more 
comprehensive trans-regional arrangement in the longer 
term. The deepening of regional economic interdependence 
will help countries manage their other differences. A set of 
arrangements that complement and strengthen each other 
and the global system is needed—not a set of arrangements 
that are competing and exclusive. This is the constructive 
diplomacy on which the Australia–Japan partnership now 
needs to be brought to bear. It would involve a more strategic 
partnership that promotes deeper regional cooperation, 
similar to when Japan and Australia led the creation of APEC.
Conclusion
The global trading system has underpinned the development 
of economic integration globally. Its success is most 
evident in the Asia–Pacific region and especially East Asia, 
which is one of the world’s most economically integrated 
regions. And the open regionalism of Asia and the Pacific 
has continued to buttress that global system. East Asian 
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economic integration has occurred despite significant 
political differences between counties and in a region 
without a regional institution with supranational authority.
That multilateral trading system is under threat. Weaknesses 
in the WTO from the inability to conclude the Doha round 
or to introduce rules relevant to cross-border business in 
the 21st century carry real risks. One consequence is that 
rule-making increasingly threatens to occur outside of 
the multilateral framework in mega-regional agreements. 
That means that developing countries will have less, if any, 
input into the rules that govern trade, and that dispute 
settlement (a strength of the current system) for WTO-plus 
areas beyond trade, and perhaps even for traditional areas 
of trade, will occur outside of a multilateral framework that’s 
accepted by all and provides a strong measure of economic 
as well as political assurance.
The erosion of the rules-based global trading system could 
lead to a collapse of confidence in the system and have 
significant implications for economic and political relations 
between countries. It would also undermine the liberal 
international order. A robust and fair global trading system 
with legitimacy is a necessary condition for furthering 
rule-making and confidence-building in other areas of the 
international order.
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Background paper
Japan–Australia cooperation in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief
Teruhiko Fukushima 
National Defense Academy of Japan
It’s often said that the 21st century is Asia’s century: we’ve 
seen the rapid growth of the new emerging economies, such 
as China and India, and it’s expected that Southeast Asian 
countries will achieve similar economic development in the 
coming decades.
The huge population of 4 billion in Asia has underpinned 
remarkable economic growth, which has brought rapid 
urbanisation in the region.
But Asia is the area that’s most affected by natural disasters. 
With its high population and recent economic growth, Asia 
suffers almost half of the world’s total damage from such 
disasters, amounting to $1,116 billion in 1983–2012. Rapid 
urbanisation and tardy development of infrastructure have 
made Asian countries vulnerable to the human, social and 
economic damage inflicted by disasters.
As trading nations, Japan and Australia have benefited 
from Asia’s economic rise. Both countries have interests in 
ensuring that regional economic growth won’t be seriously 
disrupted by severe natural disasters.
As advanced countries, we have a moral obligation to 
be active in giving humanitarian assistance in the event 
of natural calamities. It’s therefore worth developing 
constructive collaboration between us in order to strengthen 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 
capabilities, not only our own, but also those of other states 
in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Twelve measures to improve cooperation
This section outlines some measures to improve Australia–
Japan HADR cooperation.
First, we should work together to enhance our HADR 
capabilities by strengthening information exchanges and 
joint training opportunities. In doing so, both governments 
should try to engage other countries in the Indo-Pacific 
region to promote HADR cooperation.
Japan and Australia share good records of HADR cooperation 
during the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, the Great Eastern 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 and Typhoon Haiyan in the 
Philippines in 2013. In those cases, Japan’s Self-Defense 
Forces and the Australian Defence Force played important 
roles as early responders. Now the Japan–Australia 
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement has become 
effective, the two countries should strengthen the 
interoperability of our HADR capabilities by increasing 
the numbers of joint exercises, with the intention of a 
collaborative response when a big disaster hits the region 
in the future.
Second, it’s important that the first responders of both 
nations share joint training with the other members of the 
Indo-Pacific region. RIMPAC 2014 joint HADR exercises proved 
to be a good forum for multilateral cooperation, including 
with civilian players.
Japan should participate in the next Exercise Talisman Saber, 
which developed effective civil–military coordination in 
2013. As regular participants in the Pacific Partnership, both 
countries should also help the US to roll out this cooperation 
to other Indo-Pacific partners.
Third, Japan and Australia should increase opportunities for 
HADR joint exercises. It’s desirable that other countries in 
the region be engaged in such exercises, and civil–military 
coordination should be a focus.
Fourth, Japan and Australia should work together to refine 
the existing urban search and rescue (USAR) accreditation 
system under the International Search and Rescue Advisory 
Group (INSARAG) and develop mutual mentoring in close 
consultation with ASEAN counterparts.
USAR is a field in which the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) and the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade have undertaken exchanges of information 
and joint training.
We should cooperate to enhance our capabilities with 
each other, especially to upgrade our USAR skills to a level 
higher than that required in the accreditation system under 
INSARAG. This has already begun—Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services has mentored the Japan Disaster Relief 
Team at JICA’s request.
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Our governments should also involve other regional 
countries in joint training and mentoring activities, with the 
aim of developing their capacity to INSARAG-accredited 
level or higher. This would be in close communication with 
counterparts such as the ASEAN Committee on Disaster 
Management and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance 
Center. JICA would be an ideal host for such joint training, 
as it can fully utilise its own training facilities.
Fifth, the international collaboration seen in the search 
for the missing MH370 airliner showed the possibilities 
for regional cooperation in maritime and air searches. 
The search demonstrated goodwill and a cooperative 
spirit among regional players such as Japan and China, 
even when they were politically at odds.
It’s desirable to increase the opportunities for exchanges 
among the search and rescue agencies of the region. 
As search and rescue is conducted from both sea and air, 
Japan and Australia should pursue better coordination 
between the Asia–Pacific regional centres of the International 
Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.
Because joint training in maritime and air search and rescue 
can be costly, especially for the smaller developing countries 
in the Indo-Pacific region, we should cooperate in the 
development of desktop exercise methods in this field.
Sixth, despite our great capabilities and resources, Japan 
and Australia haven’t developed notable HADR cooperation 
in fields other than USAR. The Emergency Management 
Australia (EMA) is working closely with the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) to establish an accreditation system for foreign medical 
teams (FMTs) in HADR to clarify the level of assistance that 
a particular FMT can offer. Such a system will help countries 
hit by disasters to determine which FMTs to allocate to 
which areas. Sometimes affected countries are flooded 
with too many FMTs, some of which don’t have appropriate 
capabilities. This can result in additional burdens for local 
governments and communities that have to concentrate on 
helping themselves.
This FMT process has regional approval: EMA has respected 
ASEAN centrality and ASEAN members’ capabilities. Such a 
careful, steady attempt to extend HADR cooperation into the 
wider region would be highly desirable.
JICA should strongly support such a move by EMA. The prime 
ministers of Japan and Australia should offer strong support 
for establishing the medical accreditation system within 
the EAS.
Seventh, discussion on HADR cooperation in the region often 
focuses on early response, such as the dispatch of USAR 
teams and FMTs. This is understandable, as a speedy rescue 
effort, especially in the first 72 hours, matters if lives are to 
be saved. Because not many countries have early response 
capabilities adequate enough to deploy overseas, these 
questions tend to be seen as matters for those agencies 
that do.
However, discussions about HADR should also cover a wider 
range of issues, including disaster prevention and enhancing 
public awareness for preparedness. These are matters of 
concern for small island states that lack relief capabilities 
and as a result suffer significantly in times of disaster. Even 
modest preventive measures are far more effective in saving 
lives and minimising damage, and far less costly, than highly 
refined disaster relief operations.
Furthermore, it has been members of affected local 
communities, not foreign USAR teams, that have saved the 
most lives immediately after earthquakes. And widespread 
local knowledge about tsunamis can save many lives when 
people simply evacuate quickly to higher land.
Strengthening public awareness really counts in HADR for 
every government and local community. So, in developing 
cooperation on HADR, the Japanese and Australian 
Governments should consider measures to enhance public 
awareness, not only among their own citizens, but also 
among the people in the region as a whole. Both governments 
should increase their official development assistance for the 
purposes of disaster prevention.
In short, we should extend the range of HADR cooperation to 
include disaster prevention and public awareness, as well as 
early response.
Eighth, as Japan and Australia are disaster-prone countries, 
both have accumulated significant experience in disaster 
response, recovery and mitigation. Our experience should be 
shared in the region.
EMA is drafting the Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit 
for the EAS as a guide to what kinds of assistance are 
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needed in particular areas. This could be a good guide for 
regional governments that want to improve not only their 
preparedness but also their relief capabilities.
Japan can help to enrich the content of the toolkit by 
making full use of its abundant knowledge of earthquakes 
and tsunamis. Australia knows all about firefighting. 
Other countries in the region can participate in updating the 
content from their own experiences and lessons learned. 
Modest as they may be, these activities will make a huge 
contribution to community resilience and mutual confidence 
by promoting a common language about HADR. Based on that, 
we can expect spillover towards region-wide collaboration.
Japan should strongly push the publication of the toolkit, 
and both countries should move to endorse this activity as 
an official EAS achievement in forthcoming summit meetings.
Ninth, to improve public awareness about HADR in the 
region, it will be useful if regional countries can have easy 
access to knowledge and the lessons that have been learned.
Japan’s Cabinet Office has developed its website on disaster 
prevention. It now includes an English version of Japan’s 
disaster management policy and educational materials for 
mitigating damage from tsunamis. The Australian Emergency 
Management Institute has developed ‘Knowledge Hub’, 
a public educational website on disaster prevention.
While these websites focus mainly on domestic audiences, 
they also provide international visitors with useful 
information on disaster preparedness. Our two nations 
should work together to develop the content of our websites 
to help regional nations build up their knowledge about 
disaster prevention.
Australia’s website for disaster resilience education can be 
a model for educational materials for schools across the 
Indo-Pacific. Japan can contribute to public education for 
disaster prevention in the region by introducing its abundant 
examples for grassroots training in schools, offices and 
local communities. We should exchange information on our 
disaster prevention educational materials.
Tenth, while EMA has developed solid links with the EAS 
in sharing knowledge about HADR, the other Australian 
agencies seem to focus mainly on developing collaboration 
with regional partners, including Japan, in the deployment 
of rapid response teams.
In order to contribute to a rules-based regional order, it 
will be equally important for Japan and Australia not only 
to enhance our own HADR capabilities through bilateral, 
minilateral or multilateral joint training, but also to work 
together to create opportunities to improve the region’s 
preparedness for natural disasters.
But the HADR capabilities, experience and resources of 
regional countries vary widely. It may still take time to 
implement region-wide multilateral civil–military HADR joint 
training programs. Nonetheless, it may be worth starting 
regional HADR cooperation by learning from our own or other 
nations’ experiences and sharing a common HADR lexicon.
The Australian Government should upgrade information 
exchanges and coordination between EMA and the other 
agencies on HADR collaboration with regional partners, 
including Japan.
The Japanese Government should strengthen its interagency 
coordination, centred on JICA, with the specific aim of 
collaborating with Australia on HADR, from early response 
to resilience, prevention and public awareness.
Eleventh, effective HADR activities require working 
with non-government bodies, such as businesses and 
non-government organisations (NGOs).
In the age of corporate social responsibility, business has not 
only the capabilities to supply a huge range of relief, but also 
a strong interest in minimising disruptions to supply chains. 
Knowledge about minimising business risks can be applied to 
disaster prevention.
With their knowledge and links with local communities, 
NGOs provide vital information to other responders, including 
militaries, on which areas need which kind of assistance.
Japan demonstrated a model for government–business–NGO 
cooperation and coordination on HADR during the Great 
Eastern Japan Earthquake. The Japan Business Federation 
(Keidanren), Japan’s main business organisation, served 
as a contact point between business and relief bodies for 
information on material needs in disaster-affected areas 
and which corporations could supply them. Japan Platform, 
Japan’s international cooperation NGO, played coordinating 
roles with government bodies, businesses, other Japanese 
NGOs and individual volunteer workers. The information 
that NGOs brought from their local human networks proved 
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valuable for other relief agencies when the agencies had to 
judge which resources were to be allocated.
Moreover, businesses and NGOs can respond quickly to 
disasters because their decision-making processes are 
far less complicated than those of government bodies. 
To achieve more effective HADR operations, they should 
be engaged as active players.
Such an inclusive whole-of-society approach in HADR is 
desirable because it can fill a niche that the bureaucratic 
approach of government agencies sometimes misses, and 
helps to smooth the shift from early response to recovery.
For the whole-of -society approach to function, better 
communication and coordination among players are vital. 
Since this model is quite new, Japan and Australia should try 
to learn from past examples, such as the 2011 earthquake 
and tsunami.
We should exchange information on promoting the 
participation of businesses and NGOs in HADR operations, 
and especially on learning from examples in the Great 
Eastern Japan Earthquake.
Twelfth, Japan has learned many lessons from its own 
natural disasters, especially the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji 
Earthquake and 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake. 
The Japanese Government has been active in sharing such 
lessons, as shown in the hosting of the 2nd United Nations 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe in 2005, 
which carried the Hyogo Framework of Action.
But Australian HADR agencies haven’t necessarily been 
well informed about these activities, let alone Japan’s 
international promotion activities. To overcome this 
information gap, careful coordination is needed among 
HADR agencies of each country—for example, between 
JICA, Japan’s leading first responder and the Cabinet Office 
responsible for disaster reduction and promotion activities, 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s 
rapid response coordinator, and EMA, which is mainly 
responsible for domestic coordination.
On the Japanese side, JICA can be a main contact point for 
the Australian side.
The Australian Government may have to apply more 
diplomatic resources to support EMA’s initiatives within 
the EAS. Once good coordination is established, Japan 
and Australia could cooperate more effectively towards 
HADR capacity-building in the EAS, as illustrated by the 
Japan–Australia partnership that established the foundation 
for APEC.
A good starting point will be the 3rd United Nations World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction, which will be held 
in Sendai in March 2015. Japan and Australia should try 
to send ‘Team Japan’ and ‘Team Australia’, including 
representatives of the emergency services, businesses 
and NGOs. The event could be used as a springboard 
towards bilateral coordination for the whole-of-the-society 
approach in HADR.
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Introduction
On 9 July 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and 
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott issued a ‘Special 
Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century’ joint statement 
at the time of Abe’s first visit to Australia. The two leaders 
underscored ‘the importance of the East Asia Summit as 
the premier forum for addressing the strategic, political and 
economic challenges facing the region and undertook to 
work together on strengthening its role’.
On 11 June 2014, before the bilateral summit, the fifth Japan–
Australia ‘2+2’ Ministerial Meeting pledged the two countries’ 
commitment to ‘cooperating in strengthening the strategic, 
political and economic roles of the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
and to working together in the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and the ASEAN 
Expanded Maritime Forum’.
Japan and Australia are natural strategic partners, as their 
recent official statements confirmed. On 14 September 2012, 
the 4th Australia–Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial 
Consultations issued a joint statement titled ‘Common Vision 
and Objectives’. The ministers declared that:
Australia and Japan are natural strategic partners sharing 
common values and interests, including a commitment 
to democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights 
and open markets. Australia and Japan share a common 
strategic objective of ensuring long-term peace, stability 
and prosperity in the changing strategic and security 
environment in the Asia–Pacific region and beyond.
Above all, Tokyo and Canberra committed to working ever 
more closely to ensure ‘mutual support for our respective 
alliances with the United States, which continue to help 
underwrite peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia–Pacific, 
and working together as active partners to maintain and 
strengthen comprehensive US engagement in the region’. 
The two nations committed to strengthen ‘regional 
architecture, particularly the East Asia Summit, to promote 
cooperation on political, security, economic and other 
challenges facing the region’.
This paper explores practical policy implications to 
strengthen the EAS so that it may contribute to strengthening 
the rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific. It argues that 
Japan and Australia share historical experiences, common 
values and interests in multilateral cooperation in the region. 
Tokyo and Canberra can and should cooperate to work on 
strengthening the security architecture in East Asia and the 
Asia–Pacific through a leaders-led premier forum of the EAS 
together with most of the important nations in the region.
The paper starts with the background of Japan–Australia 
cooperation in regional multilateralism in the Asia–Pacific 
and East Asia. Then it goes on to analyse security trends, 
challenges and regional institutions in East Asia. It examines 
the significance and weakness of the EAS as a promising 
premier forum. The paper suggests practical ways to 
improve the EAS to strengthen the rules-based order in 
the Asia–Pacific, and explores the policy implications.
Japan, Australia and multilateralism in the 
Asia–Pacific and East Asia
Japan and Australia have long cooperated in multilateral 
forums in the Asia–Pacific and sought cooperation 
through the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and 
the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 
On the one hand, Japan looks to the values and common 
interests shared by the region’s two US allies of significance. 
Australia’s participation in the multilateral institutions of the 
Asia–Pacific is important for Japan.
In the early 1990s, some Asia-centric groupings were 
proposed that did not include the US, Australia and New 
Zealand. When former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin 
Mohamad proposed the East Asia Economic Group in 1990 
and when the Asia–Europe Meeting was established in 1995, 
it is reported that Japan sought Australian participation in 
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those multilateral forums. In the early 2000s, Japan sought 
Australia’s participation in the EAS. As early as 2002, when 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi spoke on an East 
Asian Community in Singapore, Japan insisted that Australia 
participate and proposed membership. Finally, the EAS 
was established with 16 countries, including ASEAN 10+3 
(Japan, China and South Korea) +3 (Australia, New Zealand 
and India).
More recently, on 30 May 2014, Japanese Prime Minister 
Abe delivered a speech to the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue in 
which he emphasised the importance of the rule of law in the 
region. Abe proposed that the role of the EAS be bolstered. 
His address was well supported by many countries in the 
region (see box).
Japanese PM Shinzō Abe’s proposal on the EAS at the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue on 
30 May 2014
I urge the further enhancement of the East Asia Summit, as the premier forum taking up regional politics and security. 
Next year marks the tenth anniversary of the launch of the EAS. I propose that we first create a permanent committee 
comprised of permanent representatives to ASEAN from the member countries and then prepare a road map to bring 
renewed vitality to the Summit itself, while also making the Summit along with the [ASEAN Regional Forum] and the 
ADMM-Plus function in a multilayered fashion. The first thing we should discuss is the principle of disclosure. We have all 
heard the saying that ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’. From now, Asia will continue to play the leading role in pulling the 
prosperity of the world forward. Military expansion is inherently unworthy of such a place as this. The fruits of prosperity 
should instead be reinvested into even greater prosperity and improving people’s lives. I believe that a framework under 
which we publicly disclose our military budgets step by step, that enables us to cross-check each other, is a system that 
we should seek to establish as we extend the scope of the East Asia Summit.
On the other hand, Australia has pursued active 
middle-power diplomacy to strengthen the security 
architecture in the Asia–Pacific. With the region facing 
significant changes, including the rise of China and 
China-Taiwan issues, Australia regards its role as that of an 
honest broker to maintain international order in East Asia 
and the Asia–Pacific. Australia’s main concerns are to use 
multilateral regional frameworks to secure US commitment 
to Asia and to maintain stable US–Japan–China relations. 
While the economies of East Asia have grown to be the engine 
of the global economy, Australia’s interests and stakes in East 
Asia have also increased. 
On 4 June 2008, at the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed his vision of 
an Asia–Pacific Community. Rudd declared the ‘Asia–Pacific 
century’ and noted the need for strong and effective 
regional institutions to ‘underpin an open, peaceful, stable, 
prosperous, and sustainable region’ and to address the 
‘collective challenges that no one country can address alone’. 
Prime Minister Rudd’s Asia–Pacific Community proposal 
sought equivalence with the EAS.
In July 2012, Foreign Affairs Minister Bob Carr published an 
article titled ‘The East Asia Summit: building our regional 
architecture for the 21st century’. It emphasised that ‘The 
task ahead of us … is to strengthen and entrench the EAS 
leaders’ level dialogue and advance practical proposals for 
cooperation on the broad range of economic, political and 
security challenges confronting our region.’ 
It should be noted that Tokyo and Canberra share common 
interests in the creation and strengthening of regional 
institutions in the Asia–Pacific and East Asia. First, they 
share an interest in ensuring an enduring and significant US 
commitment to the Asia–Pacific region through the EAS. 
Second, Japan and Australia share common interests in 
engaging China as a constructive and responsible player 
in the Asia–Pacific in the light of its continued ascension 
and assertive and provocative behaviour directed at its 
neighbours in the region. Third, Tokyo and Canberra share 
common interests in the management of great-power 
relations between China and the US. Fourth, both Japan and 
Australia share values and interests, including democracy, 
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human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade, 
existing international norms and regional order.
Above all, the two nations share vital common interests 
in securing the global commons in the region, including 
freedom of navigation and overflight, outer space and 
cyberspace. Japan and Australia can and should cooperate to 
strengthen regional institutions for the reasons listed above.
East Asian security and regional institutions
Security trends in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific
Today, East Asia is undergoing dramatic changes, and 
regional security trends are both complex and challenging. 
On the one hand, the shifting power balance is remarkable—
emerging powers such as China and India are rising, while US 
hegemonic power declines. In the long term, there are three 
courses of power transition: competitive, cooperative and a 
hybrid of the two. Political tensions and the risk of grey-zone 
situations in the South China Sea and East China Sea are 
notable. China’s sustained rise and assertive and intensified 
activities in various areas provoke serious concerns in 
the region and across the world. North Korea’s continued 
belligerence and military build-up, including moves towards 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, remain on the minds 
of many in the region.
On the other hand, East Asia is becoming a region of 
economic development and interdependence, political 
democratisation, cooperation and integration. Economic 
interdependence and regionalism make military conflicts 
more costly, though not unlikely. Regional institutions in the 
Asia–Pacific and East Asia enhance international cooperation 
in a range of areas and at various levels. Compared to the 
poor record of multilateralism during the Cold War, we 
have witnessed the emergence and evolution of various 
ASEAN-centred regional mechanisms, such as APEC, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+), ASEAN+3 dialogue and the EAS.
Conditions of peace and stability and regional 
institutions in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific
A rules-based regional order is important for stability, peace 
and prosperity for all parties, and to insulate against political 
change or instability caused by naked force or coercion. 
The foundational principle of a rules-based order is that all 
parties are equal in the eyes of the law. Compliance depends 
on the legitimacy, obligations and interests of the parties. 
Disobedience is caused by a lack of capability, clarity or 
priority of the rules-based order. The support of all the major 
players in the region is necessary for the maintenance of 
regional order.
Broadly speaking, any sustainable international order 
needs a proper balance of three international systems: 
a realist ‘balance of power’, a liberal ‘concert of powers’ 
or ‘cooperative security’, and an idealist international 
community. In a realist view of the power shift in East Asia, 
relations between the US and China are most important to 
the success, stability and direction of the regional order. 
With China’s rapid rise and increasing assertiveness, the US 
commitment to Asia and the US network of hub-and-spokes 
partners and allies contribute to the maintenance of a stable 
international order in East Asia. In a liberal perspective on 
cooperative security, the architecture of various regional 
institutions contributes to the preservation of peace and 
stability in East Asia and the wider Asia–Pacific region. In an 
idealist view, although an ‘East Asian community’ or an ‘Asia–
Pacific community’ remains only a long-term goal, economic 
interdependence and regional integration are ongoing across 
the region.
Scholars debate the roles and functions of regional 
institutions in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific. On the one 
hand, realists assume that international institutions are 
mere instruments of great-power influence, and so can’t play 
any significant role in rules-based order in the region. From 
this viewpoint, regional institutions reflect a power struggle 
among great powers. On the other hand, constructivists 
maintain that international institutions can enhance 
cooperative relations by moulding member states’ national 
interests and identities through norms and rules. In reality, 
it’s more pragmatic to consider both aspects of realist 
materials/powers and constructivist ideas/norms.
Regional institutions contribute to the maintenance of the 
current regional order in at least six ways:
• They underwrite the US’s engagement with the region. 
APEC and the ARF contribute to the US commitment in 
both East Asia and the Asia–Pacific, as expected by many 
regional powers.
Embargoed until 11.59PM AEDT 18 December. Media may report 19 December 2014.
38 Special Report
• Regional institutions give member states opportunities 
to participate in the norms/rules-making processes of the 
region. While ASEAN sits in the driver’s seat of regional 
cooperation, Japan and Australia also play important 
roles in these processes.
• They contribute to China’s peaceful rise by providing 
opportunities to learn the norms of cooperative security 
through multilateral dialogues. China was reluctant 
to join the ARF and other regional mechanisms, but 
understands the importance of regional cooperation in 
the processes. For example, China’s assertive stance or 
actions face criticisms by other countries in the ARF or 
the EAS.
• They enhance the management of major-power relations 
by providing opportunities for high-level dialogue. The US 
and China set up bilateral dialogues to deal with serious 
incidents by using opportunities available in APEC or the 
ARF. Despite the current difficulties between Japan and 
China, the two nations can seek opportunities for bilateral 
talks on the sidelines of APEC summits. These regional 
institutions enhance mutual understanding among 
members and functional cooperation in various areas.
• Regional institutions such as the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
enhance economic cooperation and integration which 
can benefit for peace and economic prosperity of 
the region.
• In the longer term, borrowing from European experiences, 
regional institutions have the capacity to create and 
maintain a regional international society through 
norm-building, rule-building, institution-building and 
community-building in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific.
The East Asia Summit
Origin
The concept of the EAS evolved and developed in the process 
of ASEAN+3 in the beginning of the 21st century. Concerning 
debates on creating an East Asian Community in the future, 
the East Asia Vision Group submitted a report to the ASEAN+3 
summit in 2001 on a measure to expand the summit to an 
EAS. The East Asia Study Group also submitted a report to 
the ASEAN+3 summit in 2002 that mentioned the mid- to 
long-term goal of holding an EAS meeting. In November 2004, 
the ASEAN+3 summit decided to hold the first EAS in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, the following year.
Significance and strengths
A premier forum
The EAS is a leaders-led forum for ‘strategic dialogue and 
cooperation on political, security and economic issues of 
common regional concern with the aim to promote peace, 
stability and economic prosperity in East Asia’. The EAS holds 
an annual leaders summit, usually back-to-back with the 
annual ASEAN leaders meetings and in addition to meetings 
of ministers and senior officials during the year. Even though 
APEC also holds an annual summit, it focuses mainly on 
economic and trade issues with a number of memberships 
in the wide church of the Asia–Pacific. The EAS is a premier 
forum for dealing with the most important agendas among 
all the important players in East Asia.
Membership
The EAS membership includes all the major countries in East 
Asia and the Asia–Pacific. At the 6th EAS in Bali, 18 member 
countries met and the US and Russia attended for the first 
time. Memberships include ASEAN 10+3 (Japan, China and 
South Korea) +3 (Australia, New Zealand and India) +2 (the 
US and Russia). The 18 EAS member countries together 
represent almost 55% of the world’s population and 
account for around 56% of global gross domestic product. 
The EAS has an appropriate and desirable membership 
for decision-making on East Asian affairs. The consensus 
of all the key players of East Asia helps to strengthen the 
rules-based regional order in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific.
Agendas, including political and security issues
The EAS deals with a range of important agenda items, 
including those related to regional security. In 2013, for 
example, EAS leaders discussed nuclear nonproliferation, the 
Korean Peninsula, developments in Syria and Iran, maritime 
security and the management of disputes in the South China 
Sea. The leaders also reviewed progress in priority areas of 
functional cooperation, including regional economic and 
financial integration, education, regional disaster response, 
energy, the environment, health and connectivity. The EAS 
sets up working groups in non-traditional security, such as 
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humanitarian assistance and disaster response, regional 
connectivity and maritime security. It can also enhance 
economic cooperation and integration, including through 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It works to confirm common 
principles and fundamental rules in the region by enhancing 
political and security initiatives. In addition, it promotes 
practical cooperation, connecting summit outcomes to 
tangible cooperation. Most importantly, the EAS should focus 
on the most important issues, avoiding wasting time and 
energy in discussing secondary issues.
Management of major-power relations
In the context of China’s rapid rise and the power shift in 
East Asia and the Asia–Pacific region, the management 
of US–China relations and US–Japan–China relations is 
fundamental to the peace, stability and prosperity of East 
Asia. Regional powers such as ASEAN and Australia expect 
the EAS and regional institutions to manage major-power 
relations and to avoid major-power conflicts. The EAS also 
provides valuable opportunities for bilateral talks in times 
of relational turmoil. It contributes to mutual understanding 
and functional cooperation among major powers. 
Norms/rules-building, institution building, and 
community building
The EAS contributes to norm/rule-building and reconfirms 
basic sharing principles of regional cooperation: peaceful 
conflict resolution; open, inclusive and evolutional processes 
to create habits and norms of cooperation; and respect 
for the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the UN 
Charter, and international law. Despite the slow process of 
the so-called ‘ASEAN way’, the EAS aims to play its role in 
the evolving regional architecture in the East Asian region 
and to work towards building the East Asian Community as 
a long-term goal to underwrite the maintenance of peace, 
security, prosperity and progress in the region and beyond.
Weaknesses and deficiencies
Despite its strength and potential, the EAS has its weakness 
and deficiencies. First, it doesn’t have any follow-up 
mechanisms or permanent secretariat to ensure that 
decisions taken by the leaders are enacted. The EAS is held 
on one day per year, and is often too short, too formal and 
too rigid to allow free and flexible discussions. The EAS lacks 
the capacity to implement the agreed norms or cooperative 
measures because ASEAN-centred forums are based on the 
principle of being ‘non-binding’.
Second, the ASEAN-centred process of the EAS is too slow. 
The ‘ASEAN way’ requires the consensus of all parties. The 
chairing of the EAS is dominated by ASEAN, which also 
decides topics and agendas. ASEAN has concerns that 
great powers will take initiatives and dominate the topics 
and agendas of the EAS. Most ASEAN countries also expect 
to be in a neutral position and not to be forced to choose 
between great powers. ASEAN plays a key role as the 
convener of organisations such as the ARF and EAS, but with 
centrality comes a responsibility to lead—and ASEAN is yet 
to really lead, particularly in its interactions with the wider 
membership of the EAS and the ADMM+. ASEAN is becoming 
increasingly concerned about its centrality, but this concern 
is leading to more defensive behaviour, not a willingness to 
get out in front.
Third, China tries to avoid dealing with sensitive issues 
such as Taiwan, maritime security, the South China Sea, 
mechanisms for making military build-ups transparent, 
preventive diplomacy, collective security, and so on. Beijing 
prefers to use bilateral talks or regional forums profitable 
for China, such as the ASEAN+1/+3 and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, rather than the EAS.
Finally, the American leadership tends to be impatient with 
the slow and time-consuming progress of the ASEAN-led 
meetings. Not a few Asian countries are concerned that 
the US rebalance may be undermined due to Washington 
spending time, energy and resources in dealing with 
domestic issues and other pressing affairs, such as Ukraine 
and Russia, ISIS and the Middle East more generally. 
Recommendations
Japan and Australia should patiently continue to support 
ASEAN’s unity and cohesion as well as ASEAN’s centrality in 
the EAS. Any assertive actions by Japan or Australia would 
face opposition or negative reactions from China and ASEAN. 
The ASEAN way may be time- and energy-consuming, but any 
feasible reform of the EAS would require the understanding 
and support of ASEAN countries. Japan and Australia can 
help to strengthen ASEAN and reinforce its centrality through 
targeted capacity-building.
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ASEAN needs to lead from the front and engage with 
extra-ASEAN powers in a new and more collegial way. Tokyo 
and Canberra could encourage ASEAN to work on how to 
achieve this broad shift in ASEAN’s thinking.
East Asian regional cooperation needs to respect and 
reconfirm basic sharing principles of regional cooperation: 
peaceful conflict resolution; open, inclusive and evolutionary 
processes to create habits and norms of cooperation; and 
respect for the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the 
UN Charter and international law.
The EAS should focus on worthwhile macro agenda items, 
including security and strategic issues and economic and 
financial issues. Above all, maritime security is the most 
complicated but urgent concern in East Asia. It needs 
adjustment of existing procedures for agenda-setting to 
deal with the pressing challenges and risks in the region as 
a whole. Japan and Australia ask that ASEAN may consider 
joint chairmanship of the EAS with non-ASEAN member 
countries so that the Summit meeting can talk about 
common concerns among member states in the region.
Currently, the formality of the EAS setting poses a challenge 
to free and frank discussions between states. Ample time 
should be allocated to build a collegial atmosphere that will 
encourage intensive and open dialogue.
The EAS should take initiatives to create a workable crisis 
management mechanism to support maritime security 
in the South and East China seas as well as on the Korean 
Peninsula. It should set up multi-/mini-lateral working 
groups among concerned countries to enhance functional 
cooperation on pragmatic issues and areas.
Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s proposal on the EAS deserves 
serious attention. The EAS should work to establish a clear 
vision—a road map for the EAS as the premier forum linked 
to the ARF (meeting at foreign minister level) and the ADMM+ 
(defence minister level) in a multilayered function. It should 
strengthen institutional linkages with other political–security 
forums, including the ADMM+, the ARF and the Extended 
ASEAN Maritime Forum. At first, the EAS can ask the ADMM+ 
to report its activities to the EAS, from where the EAS can 
give the ADMM+ directions and tasking.
The EAS should create a permanent committee or secretariat 
within or alongside the ASEAN secretariat in order to 
build continuity between summits, so that the EAS can be 
responsible for implementing decisions and accountability 
can be assigned to EAS leaders.
The rise of China is the most pressing challenge to the 
future of East Asia. The EAS should be a premier leaders-led 
forum to engage and encourage China as a responsible and 
constructive player in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific.
There are significant opportunities for Japan and Australia to 
support the EAS. The two nations can and should cooperate 
with the US, India, ASEAN and other like-minded partners on 
the EAS in order to strengthen the rules-based regional order 
for peace, prosperity and progress in the Asia–Pacific.
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Introduction
Like Japan, Australia is a trading nation. Our economic 
prosperity and security depends on the free flow of goods 
and services in the global market, open access to ocean trade 
routes and international communications and appropriate 
regulation of emerging technologies. 
International law plays a key role in setting rules for 
these diverse issues. Adherence to a predictable, global 
rules-based system underpins our economic growth and is 
essential if States are to resolve their differences peacefully. 
The instinct of the lawyer can be to insist every new challenge 
is best met with greater regulation. But it is testament to 
the durability of the international law system that many of 
the fundamental principles to address trade, environmental 
protection and emerging technologies are already in place. 
There is no need to unnecessarily reinvent the regulatory 
wheel. Appropriate regulation of these challenges may 
require only smaller or nuanced changes based on the 
fundamental rules already in place - to address gaps and 
ensure greater coordination between complex international 
rules. In many cases, political will to implement existing rules 
is what is actually needed.
Rule of law
As we all know, the transformation and growth of the Asian 
region is gathering pace.
With this change our region will be the world’s largest 
producer of goods and services and the largest consumer 
of them. This will also bring greater political and strategic 
weight to the region.
In a diverse region such as Asia, a fair, rules-based order is 
conducive to political stability, and open and reliable trading 
environment, and confidence in investment.
Strengthened law and justice frameworks increase our ability 
to combat serious organised and transnational crime. This in 
turn promotes a safer regional environment for the trade in 
goods and services.
The Attorney-General’s portfolio plays an important role 
in supporting the rule of law and effective governance in 
Asia, including through promoting work to combat people 
smuggling, terrorism, money laundering and corruption. 
In fact, as part of Australia’s G20 Presidency this year, 
my Department is co-chairing the Anti-Corruption 
Working Group. 
Access to trade 
As early as 1608, Grotius (the ‘Father of International Law’) 
opined, “every nation is free to travel to every other nation 
and to trade with it”. Trade fuels economic growth, supports 
jobs, raises living standards and provides affordable goods 
and services.
Australia is committed to the wide-ranging benefits of 
liberalising trade. We have prioritised bilateral, regional and 
global trade agreements that open up markets for Australian 
exporters and sustain a strong, rules-based architecture for 
global trade. 
• In addition to the six free trade agreements Australia 
currently has with its Asia Pacific trading partners, 
Australia recently announced the conclusion of 
negotiations on historic trade agreements with Korea 
and Japan.
Trade Agreements cannot be meaningful without the ability 
to freely move goods around the world. As island nations, 
shipping plays a critical role in facilitating Australia and 
Japan’s trade networks.
• 98 per cent of Australia’s trade by volume is exported 
by sea.
Since 1945, the Asia-Pacific region has become the fastest 
growing and most dynamic region of the global economy, 
with increasing intra and interregional seaborne trade.
All trading nations have a common interest in ensuring 
the maintenance of maritime security, unimpeded trade 
and freedom of navigation through the shipping routes in 
the region.
The trade route through the South China Sea is a case in 
point. Up to 57 per cent of Australia’s merchandise exports 
and 48 per cent of the world’s merchandise trade pass 
through the South China Sea.
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Australia does not take a position on competing claims in 
the East China Sea and South China Sea. We recognise that 
resolution of disputes is an issue for the countries involved.
However, we have a legitimate interest in the maintenance 
of peace and stability, respect for international law, maritime 
security and unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation 
and overflight in the Asia-Pacific region.
Having parties to the dispute agree to the rules of the 
game would greatly assist in promote peace and stability 
in the region.
The UN Charter encourages states to seek regional solutions 
to regional disputes.
In this respect, Australia continues to encourage China and 
ASEAN countries to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct for 
the South China Sea.
International developments in Law of the Sea
Whilst freedom of sea navigation is critical, Australia 
recognises the importance of conserving and managing the 
oceans resources and the environment that sustains them. 
• This includes in areas beyond national jurisdiction - on 
the high seas and deep seabed. These areas contain 
ecosystems with unique features worthy of conservation 
and offer prospects for scientific advancement and 
commercial development. 
Internationally, concern has grown about the impact of new 
human activity on the marine environment. There is also 
poor coordination between existing oceans institutions 
and sectors (in fisheries, mining and shipping) and gaps in 
regulatory frameworks.
• For example, there is currently no global framework 
for marine protected areas on the high seas or for the 
conduct of environmental impact assessments. Whilst the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulates 
deep-sea mining, there is no global framework to regulate 
marine genetic resources taken from the seabed and 
commercially developed.
Australia (and Japan) are actively participating in United 
Nations discussions on a potential new treaty under UNCLOS 
on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdiction. It is early days and the scope of 
any new treaty is yet to be determined. If discussions moved 
forward, the treaty would likely cover access and benefit 
sharing of marine genetic resources and marine protected 
areas and environmental impact assessments on the 
high seas.
Some States (like Japan) are concerned that a new treaty could 
encroach upon or diminish regional fisheries arrangements or 
duplicate the work of existing international institutions. 
However, Australia thinks such concerns can be overcome. 
We support shaping a new treaty which is consistent with 
UNCLOS and its implementing agreements and which 
recognises the mandates of existing international institutions 
and regional arrangements. Coordination between the 
different sectors and institutions that cover these oceans 
areas will be key. 
Japan and Australia may not agree on every issue at every 
regional or international meeting. But what we share 
is a belief in cooperation and that being ‘at the table’ 
is important.
Both States participate actively in fora such as the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to regulate and 
reduce the pollution from ships and in regional fisheries 
management organisations to ensure sustainable fisheries.
The patchwork of international and regional oceans-related 
law highlights the complexity of international regulation 
States have to deal with in one area alone.
Whilst multilateral treaties are a traditional source of 
international law, they can be notoriously difficult and 
time consuming to negotiate. Perhaps because of this, 
States are finding complementary and creative ways to 
develop international law and strategic legal policy in 
regional organisations or in coalitions of like-minded 
states. Australia’s participation in the East Asia Summit 
is a particularly valuable example.
The political appetite for binding international law will vary 
according to the issue. However, soft law developed in this 
way can also have a normative effect over time. 
Protecting cyber networks
Apart from access to global trade, Australia’s prosperity 
heavily depends on safe and secure access to international 
communications. This is a critical capacity that includes a 
vast array of infrastructure – submarine cables, banking and 
telecommunication networks.
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A free and open internet is essential to regional prosperity.
Cyberspace enables and contributes to economic growth, 
generates innovation, improves productivity and opens up 
new markets. 
Australia believes that an open and dynamic cyberspace is 
the best way to foster this prosperity and encourage citizens 
to interact with their government. 
We are committed to promoting the underlying principles 
of the Internet – as an open, decentralised and accessible 
space that supports technical innovation and freedom of 
expression and association online. This is the best way to 
drive international trade and economic prosperity. 
But these unique characteristics of cyberspace also provide 
opportunities for malicious cyber activity. The internet 
transcends national borders. It is anonymous. This makes 
cyberspace vulnerable to cyber exploitation and attacks. 
Harmful acts are extremely difficult to attribute to a State or 
individual. Responding to these different acts is challenging. 
The Edward Snowden allegations have complicated this 
environment and the context in which the norms debate 
takes place.
Concerns about privacy and mass surveillance have 
unhelpfully become conflated with international debates 
around the governance and management of the internet.  
Suspicion and distrust are feeding the desire from some 
countries for increased State regulation of the Internet 
through the United Nations.
When it comes to governance, Australia believes that 
everyone should be involved. Internet governance is not just 
for governments. While some government involvement in 
internet governance is necessary, for example Australia and 
Japan have both ratified the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime -we like the fact that no one single organisation 
or government owns or controls the Internet. Accordingly, we 
support a multi-stakeholder model for internet governance 
- where private sector, governments and users contribute 
to shaping the evolution and use of the Internet. This is this 
highly participatory model that has driven the openness and 
innovative characteristics of the internet that we see today.
There is ongoing international dialogue on the issue of State 
behaviour in cyberspace. As in the offline world, a common 
understanding of norms of behaviour promotes predictability 
in relations between States in cyberspace.
Australia’s view is that existing international law, including 
human rights law, is applicable in cyberspace.
Indeed, an Australian (Ms Deborah Stokes) chaired the most 
recent UN Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber, which 
delivered a landmark report supporting this view. 
However, much work remains to be done to reach consensus 
on how such bodies of law apply to cyberspace. A new UN 
Group of Government Experts has been created to continue 
this discussion.
Australia believes that developing confidence building 
measures between States as this work progresses, are 
an immediate and practical means of ensuring common 
understanding and promoting predictability within 
our region.
Work being undertaken through the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
including the recent workshop we hosted with Malaysia 
on confidence building measures, is essential to achieving 
these objectives.
We thank Japan for its significant contribution to this work.
Regulation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Public commentary on UAVs or drones has centred on their 
controversial use in counter-terrorism operations and 
military theatre.
In this regard, they have sustained a bad reputation 
– associated with civilian casualties and possible 
‘remote-control’ warfare.
I don’t intend to debate the validity of these claims, only to 
say that in terms of accountability, where UAVs are used to 
carry weapons they are subject to the same international 
law requirements on the use of force and the conduct of 
hostilities as other weapons.
Clearly UAVs offer the potential for positive opportunities 
beyond the military to a range of security, law enforcement 
and commercial application. But they have also raised 
questions concerning privacy, trespass and boundaries 
for surveillance.
There are diverse UAV models in use today each with 
different characteristics, capabilities and possible uses. 
For government there is clear application for border 
protection, law enforcement, emergency response, 
search and rescue, and surveillance. The Australian 
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Federal Police uses UAVs to support operations and crime 
scene management and is trailing one to support public 
safety operations including in search and rescue, and 
tactical operations.
UAV technology is also becoming more affordable and 
accessible, including by private individuals. They are 
increasingly being used by non-government entities and 
private citizens for surveying, photography, filming public 
events, wildlife and marine protection, and recreation. 
UAVs do not necessarily pose different legal or policy 
challenges to manned aircraft or other devices used to 
perform the same functions. However, the smaller sizes, 
greater flexibility of use means there is potential for their 
use in a range of new contexts. 
Relevant laws are generally technology neutral and apply to 
the use of UAVs in the same way they would apply to other 
means of undertaking the same activities. The exception is 
civil aviation laws, which specifically regulate the use of UAVs 
in an air safety context. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
is developing safety standards for UAVs in order to integrate 
them in all classes of airspace. 
My Department has not yet identified any significant 
deficiencies in the coverage of our existing policy and 
regulatory frameworks. It is possible that future growth 
in the number of UAVs and their new uses may challenge 
the effectiveness of those frameworks. Accordingly, 
the Department will continue to monitor developments 
in this area.
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Appendix 1: Programme for the symposium 
Strengthening rules-based order in the Asia–Pacific 
Developing an Australia-Japan agenda for strengthening agreed rules and norms in the 
Asia–Pacific
Symposium on Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation 
Hyatt Hotel, Canberra 
2 June 2014
0830 - 0900 Registration and coffee  
0900 - 0910 Welcome and Introductory Remarks
Mr Peter Jennings PSM, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia
His Excellency Mr Yoshitaka Akimoto, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of Japan, 
Canberra
0910 - 1025 Session 1 - Shipping, Fisheries and the Maritime Environment 
Chairperson: Mr Michael Kinley, Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Subject matter experts: 
• Prof Taisaku Ikeshima, Waseda University
• Ms Joanna Mossop, Victoria University of Wellington
• Prof Stuart Kaye, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong
The last few decades have seen a proliferation of international instruments establishing rules for managing 
the oceans and its various uses. Under the principle of ‘think globally, act regionally and nationally’, 
implementation is necessary at the regional and national levels. However, many instruments, including ones 
about shipping and protecting the marine environment and fishing, are not well supported in the region. 
Why is this so? How can we get better rules for shipping, fisheries and the maritime environment and how 
do we enforce these rules eg. role of coastguards, regional organisations?
1025 - 1045 Coffee
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1045 - 1200 Session 2 - Promoting Rule of Law in Conflict Affected States
Chairperson: Professor the Hon Gareth Evans AC, QC, FASSA, Australian National University
Subject matter experts: 
• Dr Noel M. Morada, Asia–Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland
• Dr Toshiya Hoshino, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University 
• Ms Lisa Sharland, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Ensuring respect for the rule of law lays at the heart of building durable peace, protecting human rights, and 
encouraging sustained economic and social development in post-conflict states. How has the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) doctrine developed and where should regional actors focus efforts to strengthen R2P 
principles? What are the shared lessons to be learned from peacekeeping and other operational activities led 
and supported by regional players? How should regional actors contribute to conflict prevention activities 
to manage conflicts and ensure peaceful and successful transitions? How does trauma affect post-conflict 
communities and how does it challenge the building of rule of law? 
1200 - 1300 Lunch 
1300 - 1415 Session 3 - Sustaining Rules-based Order in International Trade and Economic Cooperation
Chairperson: Professor Peter Drysdale AM, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University
Subject matter experts: 
• Dr Joshua Meltzer, The Brookings Institution
• Prof Takashi Terada, Doshisha University
• Mr Richard Andrews, G20 Policy Division, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
There exist significant opportunities for economies across the Asia–Pacific continue to grow and strengthen 
on the basis of a sound regional rules-based economic order. How does the G20 contribute to the rules-based 
order in the Asia–Pacific? How can the rules-based order support free trade? What opportunities are available 
for regulatory frameworks to be liberalised? Is reform needed in policies related to foreign ownership? How can 
economic and trade policies across the region be harmonised to support international economic cooperation?
1415 - 1435 Coffee
1435 - 1550 Session 4 - Cyberspace and Internet Governance
Chairperson: Dr Tobias Feakin, International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Subject matter experts: 
• Dr Hitoshi Nasu, College of Law, Australian National University
• Ms Maeve Dion, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University
Cyber space has continued to grow as an important arena in which governments and citizens can act. How 
does the existing geopolitical context affect the development of a regional legal framework for cyber security? 
What challenges does the development of cyber capabilities pose to the existing rules of international law? 
Cyber maturity across the region is variable, with some states possessing highly developed capabilities while 
other states are in the early stages of this work. 
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Regardless of the degree to which a state is active in cyberspace, it is key that actors in the region contribute 
to the establishment of clear and identifiable behavioural norms. What do these norms currently look like? 
How should state actors shape these norms? What regulation is needed in this space? Are international 
organisations needed to moderate norms and practices in the cyber realm? In a decisive year for the future 
of the Internet, this exercise is also important with regard to answering questions of Internet governance. 
How does a free and open Internet contribute to the prosperity of our region? What are the dangers in moving 
to state-based Internet control? How can Australia and Japan proliferate the ideal of an open Internet across 
the region?
1550 - 1605 Coffee
1605 - 1720 Session 5 - Emerging Challenges in Airspace and Outer space
Chairperson: AIRMSHL John Harvey AM (Ret’d)
• Mr Terry Farquharson, Civil Aviation Safety Authority
• Group Captain Ian Henderson AM, Military Law Centre and Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law
Significant technological advancement will continue to push states into new areas of operation. As unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) have proliferated throughout militaries and the commercial sector, serious 
legal questions for governments and regional organisations are being raised. These are related to concerns 
about individual privacy, as well as the use of drones by militaries for surveillance and targeted strike beyond 
national borders. Are existing international legal frameworks adequate to deal with the emerging military use 
of drones? Has the US set a precedent for the use of drones by other states over the past decade? How will 
commercial uses of drones impact domestic laws regarding the airspace?
The governance and defence of the air commons is a significant issue for states in the Asia–Pacific with the 
proliferation of symmetric and asymmetric capabilities allowing both state and non-state actors to challenge 
order in airspace. How is the air commons contested in the region? How can the openness and stability of 
the air commons be protected? What international agreements are needed to strengthen governance of the 
air commons?
The space commons facilitates the sound functioning of global political and economic systems. While the 
international community wishes to ensure the continued openness of space, its inherent fragility is threatened 
by a lack of policy for its protection and management. What are the main threats and challenges facing the 
space common? What frameworks and agreements should be developed for the structured management of 
space? How can regional actors be encouraged to contribute positively to the space commons?
From 1900 Symposium Dinner
Dinner speech by Mr Roger Wilkins AO, Secretary, Attorney General’s Department
‘The role of a rules-based order in promoting prosperity in the Asia–Pacific’
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Acronyms and abbreviations
ADMM+ ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
AMRO ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Reseach Office
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CERT computer emergency response team
EAS East Asia Summit
EMA Emergency Management Australia
EU European Union
FMT foreign medical team
FTA free trade agreement
G20 Group of Twenty
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT information and communications technology
IMO International Maritime Organization
INSARAG International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
NGO non-government organisation
R2P responsibility to protect




USAR urban search and rescue
WTO World Trade Organization
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